The concept of personal networks is very user-centric and representative for the next generation networks. However, the present security mechanism does not consider at all what happens whenever a mobile node (device) is compromised, lost or stolen. Of course, a compromised, lost or stolen mobile node (device) is a main factor to leak stored secrets. This kind of leakage of stored secrets remains a great danger in the field of communication security since it can lead to the complete breakdown of the intended security level. In order to solve this problem, we propose a 3-way Leakage-Resilient and Forward-Secure Authenticated Key Exchange (3LRFS-AKE) protocol and its security architecture suitable for personal networks. The 3LRFS-AKE protocol guarantees not only forward secrecy of the shared key between device and its server as well as providing a new additional layer of security against the leakage of stored secrets. The proposed security architecture includes two different types of communications: PN wide communication and communication between P-PANs of two different users. In addition, we give a performance evaluation and numerical results of the delay generated by the proposed security architecture.
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SeongHan SHIN, Hanane FATHI, Kazukuni KOBARA, Neeli R. PRASAD, Hideki IMAI, "A New Security Architecture for Personal Networks and Its Performance Evaluation" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications,
vol. E91-B, no. 7, pp. 2255-2264, July 2008, doi: 10.1093/ietcom/e91-b.7.2255.
Abstract: The concept of personal networks is very user-centric and representative for the next generation networks. However, the present security mechanism does not consider at all what happens whenever a mobile node (device) is compromised, lost or stolen. Of course, a compromised, lost or stolen mobile node (device) is a main factor to leak stored secrets. This kind of leakage of stored secrets remains a great danger in the field of communication security since it can lead to the complete breakdown of the intended security level. In order to solve this problem, we propose a 3-way Leakage-Resilient and Forward-Secure Authenticated Key Exchange (3LRFS-AKE) protocol and its security architecture suitable for personal networks. The 3LRFS-AKE protocol guarantees not only forward secrecy of the shared key between device and its server as well as providing a new additional layer of security against the leakage of stored secrets. The proposed security architecture includes two different types of communications: PN wide communication and communication between P-PANs of two different users. In addition, we give a performance evaluation and numerical results of the delay generated by the proposed security architecture.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/communications/10.1093/ietcom/e91-b.7.2255/_p
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@ARTICLE{e91-b_7_2255,
author={SeongHan SHIN, Hanane FATHI, Kazukuni KOBARA, Neeli R. PRASAD, Hideki IMAI, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications},
title={A New Security Architecture for Personal Networks and Its Performance Evaluation},
year={2008},
volume={E91-B},
number={7},
pages={2255-2264},
abstract={The concept of personal networks is very user-centric and representative for the next generation networks. However, the present security mechanism does not consider at all what happens whenever a mobile node (device) is compromised, lost or stolen. Of course, a compromised, lost or stolen mobile node (device) is a main factor to leak stored secrets. This kind of leakage of stored secrets remains a great danger in the field of communication security since it can lead to the complete breakdown of the intended security level. In order to solve this problem, we propose a 3-way Leakage-Resilient and Forward-Secure Authenticated Key Exchange (3LRFS-AKE) protocol and its security architecture suitable for personal networks. The 3LRFS-AKE protocol guarantees not only forward secrecy of the shared key between device and its server as well as providing a new additional layer of security against the leakage of stored secrets. The proposed security architecture includes two different types of communications: PN wide communication and communication between P-PANs of two different users. In addition, we give a performance evaluation and numerical results of the delay generated by the proposed security architecture.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1093/ietcom/e91-b.7.2255},
ISSN={1745-1345},
month={July},}
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TY - JOUR
TI - A New Security Architecture for Personal Networks and Its Performance Evaluation
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications
SP - 2255
EP - 2264
AU - SeongHan SHIN
AU - Hanane FATHI
AU - Kazukuni KOBARA
AU - Neeli R. PRASAD
AU - Hideki IMAI
PY - 2008
DO - 10.1093/ietcom/e91-b.7.2255
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications
SN - 1745-1345
VL - E91-B
IS - 7
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications
Y1 - July 2008
AB - The concept of personal networks is very user-centric and representative for the next generation networks. However, the present security mechanism does not consider at all what happens whenever a mobile node (device) is compromised, lost or stolen. Of course, a compromised, lost or stolen mobile node (device) is a main factor to leak stored secrets. This kind of leakage of stored secrets remains a great danger in the field of communication security since it can lead to the complete breakdown of the intended security level. In order to solve this problem, we propose a 3-way Leakage-Resilient and Forward-Secure Authenticated Key Exchange (3LRFS-AKE) protocol and its security architecture suitable for personal networks. The 3LRFS-AKE protocol guarantees not only forward secrecy of the shared key between device and its server as well as providing a new additional layer of security against the leakage of stored secrets. The proposed security architecture includes two different types of communications: PN wide communication and communication between P-PANs of two different users. In addition, we give a performance evaluation and numerical results of the delay generated by the proposed security architecture.
ER -