This letter points out some flaws in the previous works on UKS (unknown key-share) attacks. We show that Blake-Wilson and Menezes' revised STS-MAC (Station-to-Station Message Authentication Code) protocol, which was proposed to prevent UKS attack, is still vulnerable to a new UKS attack. Also, Hirose and Yoshida's key agreement protocol presented at PKC'98 is shown to be insecure against public key substitution UKS attacks. Finally, we discuss countermeasures for such UKS attacks.
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Joonsang BAEK, Kwangjo KIM, "Remarks on the Unknown Key Share Attacks" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E83-A, no. 12, pp. 2766-2769, December 2000, doi: .
Abstract: This letter points out some flaws in the previous works on UKS (unknown key-share) attacks. We show that Blake-Wilson and Menezes' revised STS-MAC (Station-to-Station Message Authentication Code) protocol, which was proposed to prevent UKS attack, is still vulnerable to a new UKS attack. Also, Hirose and Yoshida's key agreement protocol presented at PKC'98 is shown to be insecure against public key substitution UKS attacks. Finally, we discuss countermeasures for such UKS attacks.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/e83-a_12_2766/_p
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@ARTICLE{e83-a_12_2766,
author={Joonsang BAEK, Kwangjo KIM, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Remarks on the Unknown Key Share Attacks},
year={2000},
volume={E83-A},
number={12},
pages={2766-2769},
abstract={This letter points out some flaws in the previous works on UKS (unknown key-share) attacks. We show that Blake-Wilson and Menezes' revised STS-MAC (Station-to-Station Message Authentication Code) protocol, which was proposed to prevent UKS attack, is still vulnerable to a new UKS attack. Also, Hirose and Yoshida's key agreement protocol presented at PKC'98 is shown to be insecure against public key substitution UKS attacks. Finally, we discuss countermeasures for such UKS attacks.},
keywords={},
doi={},
ISSN={},
month={December},}
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TY - JOUR
TI - Remarks on the Unknown Key Share Attacks
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 2766
EP - 2769
AU - Joonsang BAEK
AU - Kwangjo KIM
PY - 2000
DO -
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN -
VL - E83-A
IS - 12
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - December 2000
AB - This letter points out some flaws in the previous works on UKS (unknown key-share) attacks. We show that Blake-Wilson and Menezes' revised STS-MAC (Station-to-Station Message Authentication Code) protocol, which was proposed to prevent UKS attack, is still vulnerable to a new UKS attack. Also, Hirose and Yoshida's key agreement protocol presented at PKC'98 is shown to be insecure against public key substitution UKS attacks. Finally, we discuss countermeasures for such UKS attacks.
ER -