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Almost all of the current public-key cryptosystems (PKCs) are based on number theory, such as the integer factoring problem and the discrete logarithm problem (which will be solved in polynomial-time after the emergence of quantum computers). While the McEliece PKC is based on another theory, i.e. coding theory, it is vulnerable against several practical attacks. In this paper, we summarize currently known attacks to the McEliece PKC, and then point out that, without any decryption oracles or any partial knowledge on the plaintext of the challenge ciphertext, no polynomial-time algorithm is known for inverting the McEliece PKC whose parameters are carefully chosen. Under the assumption that this inverting problem is hard, we propose a slightly modified version of McEliece PKC that can be proven, in the random oracle model, to be semantically secure against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks. Our conversion can achieve the reduction of the redundant data down to 1/3-1/4 compared with the generic conversions for practical parameters.

- Publication
- IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals Vol.E85-A No.1 pp.74-83

- Publication Date
- 2002/01/01

- Publicized

- Online ISSN

- DOI

- Type of Manuscript
- Special Section PAPER (Special Section on Cryptography and Information Security)

- Category

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Kazukuni KOBARA, Hideki IMAI, "Semantically Secure McEliece Public-Key Cryptosystem" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E85-A, no. 1, pp. 74-83, January 2002, doi: .

Abstract: Almost all of the current public-key cryptosystems (PKCs) are based on number theory, such as the integer factoring problem and the discrete logarithm problem (which will be solved in polynomial-time after the emergence of quantum computers). While the McEliece PKC is based on another theory, i.e. coding theory, it is vulnerable against several practical attacks. In this paper, we summarize currently known attacks to the McEliece PKC, and then point out that, without any decryption oracles or any partial knowledge on the plaintext of the challenge ciphertext, no polynomial-time algorithm is known for inverting the McEliece PKC whose parameters are carefully chosen. Under the assumption that this inverting problem is hard, we propose a slightly modified version of McEliece PKC that can be proven, in the random oracle model, to be semantically secure against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks. Our conversion can achieve the reduction of the redundant data down to 1/3-1/4 compared with the generic conversions for practical parameters.

URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/e85-a_1_74/_p

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@ARTICLE{e85-a_1_74,

author={Kazukuni KOBARA, Hideki IMAI, },

journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},

title={Semantically Secure McEliece Public-Key Cryptosystem},

year={2002},

volume={E85-A},

number={1},

pages={74-83},

abstract={Almost all of the current public-key cryptosystems (PKCs) are based on number theory, such as the integer factoring problem and the discrete logarithm problem (which will be solved in polynomial-time after the emergence of quantum computers). While the McEliece PKC is based on another theory, i.e. coding theory, it is vulnerable against several practical attacks. In this paper, we summarize currently known attacks to the McEliece PKC, and then point out that, without any decryption oracles or any partial knowledge on the plaintext of the challenge ciphertext, no polynomial-time algorithm is known for inverting the McEliece PKC whose parameters are carefully chosen. Under the assumption that this inverting problem is hard, we propose a slightly modified version of McEliece PKC that can be proven, in the random oracle model, to be semantically secure against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks. Our conversion can achieve the reduction of the redundant data down to 1/3-1/4 compared with the generic conversions for practical parameters.},

keywords={},

doi={},

ISSN={},

month={January},}

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TY - JOUR

TI - Semantically Secure McEliece Public-Key Cryptosystem

T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals

SP - 74

EP - 83

AU - Kazukuni KOBARA

AU - Hideki IMAI

PY - 2002

DO -

JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals

SN -

VL - E85-A

IS - 1

JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals

Y1 - January 2002

AB - Almost all of the current public-key cryptosystems (PKCs) are based on number theory, such as the integer factoring problem and the discrete logarithm problem (which will be solved in polynomial-time after the emergence of quantum computers). While the McEliece PKC is based on another theory, i.e. coding theory, it is vulnerable against several practical attacks. In this paper, we summarize currently known attacks to the McEliece PKC, and then point out that, without any decryption oracles or any partial knowledge on the plaintext of the challenge ciphertext, no polynomial-time algorithm is known for inverting the McEliece PKC whose parameters are carefully chosen. Under the assumption that this inverting problem is hard, we propose a slightly modified version of McEliece PKC that can be proven, in the random oracle model, to be semantically secure against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks. Our conversion can achieve the reduction of the redundant data down to 1/3-1/4 compared with the generic conversions for practical parameters.

ER -