The search functionality is under construction.
The search functionality is under construction.

A Stackelberg Game-Theoretic Solution to Win-Win Situation: A Presale Mechanism in Spectrum Market

Wei BAI, Yuli ZHANG, Meng WANG, Jin CHEN, Han JIANG, Zhan GAO, Donglin JIAO

  • Full Text Views

    0

  • Cite this

Summary :

This paper investigates the spectrum allocation problem. Under the current spectrum management mode, large amount of spectrum resource is wasted due to uncertainty of user's demand. To reduce the impact of uncertainty, a presale mechanism is designed based on spectrum pool. In this mechanism, the spectrum manager provides spectrum resource at a favorable price for presale aiming at sharing with user the risk caused by uncertainty of demand. Because of the hierarchical characteristic, we build a spectrum market Stackelberg game, in which the manager acts as leader and user as follower. Then proof of the uniqueness and optimality of Stackelberg Equilibrium is given. Simulation results show the presale mechanism can promote profits for both sides and reduce temporary scheduling.

Publication
IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information Vol.E102-D No.12 pp.2607-2610
Publication Date
2019/12/01
Publicized
2019/08/28
Online ISSN
1745-1361
DOI
10.1587/transinf.2019EDL8095
Type of Manuscript
LETTER
Category
Information Network

Authors

Wei BAI
  Army Engineering University of PLA,Guilin University of Technology
Yuli ZHANG
  Guilin University of Technology,Academy of Military Sciences PLA China
Meng WANG
  Army Engineering University of PLA
Jin CHEN
  Army Engineering University of PLA
Han JIANG
  Army Engineering University of PLA
Zhan GAO
  Nanjing Intelligent Information Technology Development Co., Ltd
Donglin JIAO
  Northwest Institute of Nuclear Technology

Keyword