This paper investigates the spectrum allocation problem. Under the current spectrum management mode, large amount of spectrum resource is wasted due to uncertainty of user's demand. To reduce the impact of uncertainty, a presale mechanism is designed based on spectrum pool. In this mechanism, the spectrum manager provides spectrum resource at a favorable price for presale aiming at sharing with user the risk caused by uncertainty of demand. Because of the hierarchical characteristic, we build a spectrum market Stackelberg game, in which the manager acts as leader and user as follower. Then proof of the uniqueness and optimality of Stackelberg Equilibrium is given. Simulation results show the presale mechanism can promote profits for both sides and reduce temporary scheduling.
Wei BAI
Army Engineering University of PLA,Guilin University of Technology
Yuli ZHANG
Guilin University of Technology,Academy of Military Sciences PLA China
Meng WANG
Army Engineering University of PLA
Jin CHEN
Army Engineering University of PLA
Han JIANG
Army Engineering University of PLA
Zhan GAO
Nanjing Intelligent Information Technology Development Co., Ltd
Donglin JIAO
Northwest Institute of Nuclear Technology
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Wei BAI, Yuli ZHANG, Meng WANG, Jin CHEN, Han JIANG, Zhan GAO, Donglin JIAO, "A Stackelberg Game-Theoretic Solution to Win-Win Situation: A Presale Mechanism in Spectrum Market" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information,
vol. E102-D, no. 12, pp. 2607-2610, December 2019, doi: 10.1587/transinf.2019EDL8095.
Abstract: This paper investigates the spectrum allocation problem. Under the current spectrum management mode, large amount of spectrum resource is wasted due to uncertainty of user's demand. To reduce the impact of uncertainty, a presale mechanism is designed based on spectrum pool. In this mechanism, the spectrum manager provides spectrum resource at a favorable price for presale aiming at sharing with user the risk caused by uncertainty of demand. Because of the hierarchical characteristic, we build a spectrum market Stackelberg game, in which the manager acts as leader and user as follower. Then proof of the uniqueness and optimality of Stackelberg Equilibrium is given. Simulation results show the presale mechanism can promote profits for both sides and reduce temporary scheduling.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/information/10.1587/transinf.2019EDL8095/_p
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@ARTICLE{e102-d_12_2607,
author={Wei BAI, Yuli ZHANG, Meng WANG, Jin CHEN, Han JIANG, Zhan GAO, Donglin JIAO, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information},
title={A Stackelberg Game-Theoretic Solution to Win-Win Situation: A Presale Mechanism in Spectrum Market},
year={2019},
volume={E102-D},
number={12},
pages={2607-2610},
abstract={This paper investigates the spectrum allocation problem. Under the current spectrum management mode, large amount of spectrum resource is wasted due to uncertainty of user's demand. To reduce the impact of uncertainty, a presale mechanism is designed based on spectrum pool. In this mechanism, the spectrum manager provides spectrum resource at a favorable price for presale aiming at sharing with user the risk caused by uncertainty of demand. Because of the hierarchical characteristic, we build a spectrum market Stackelberg game, in which the manager acts as leader and user as follower. Then proof of the uniqueness and optimality of Stackelberg Equilibrium is given. Simulation results show the presale mechanism can promote profits for both sides and reduce temporary scheduling.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transinf.2019EDL8095},
ISSN={1745-1361},
month={December},}
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TY - JOUR
TI - A Stackelberg Game-Theoretic Solution to Win-Win Situation: A Presale Mechanism in Spectrum Market
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
SP - 2607
EP - 2610
AU - Wei BAI
AU - Yuli ZHANG
AU - Meng WANG
AU - Jin CHEN
AU - Han JIANG
AU - Zhan GAO
AU - Donglin JIAO
PY - 2019
DO - 10.1587/transinf.2019EDL8095
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
SN - 1745-1361
VL - E102-D
IS - 12
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
Y1 - December 2019
AB - This paper investigates the spectrum allocation problem. Under the current spectrum management mode, large amount of spectrum resource is wasted due to uncertainty of user's demand. To reduce the impact of uncertainty, a presale mechanism is designed based on spectrum pool. In this mechanism, the spectrum manager provides spectrum resource at a favorable price for presale aiming at sharing with user the risk caused by uncertainty of demand. Because of the hierarchical characteristic, we build a spectrum market Stackelberg game, in which the manager acts as leader and user as follower. Then proof of the uniqueness and optimality of Stackelberg Equilibrium is given. Simulation results show the presale mechanism can promote profits for both sides and reduce temporary scheduling.
ER -