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Akihiro SATOH Yutaka NAKAMURA Daiki NOBAYASHI Kazuto SASAI Gen KITAGATA Takeshi IKENAGA
Some of the most serious threats to network security involve malware. One common way to detect malware-infected machines in a network is by monitoring communications based on blacklists. However, such detection is problematic because (1) no blacklist is completely reliable, and (2) blacklists do not provide the sufficient evidence to allow administrators to determine the validity and accuracy of the detection results. In this paper, we propose a malicious DNS query clustering approach for blacklist-based detection. Unlike conventional classification, our cause-based classification can efficiently analyze malware communications, allowing infected machines in the network to be addressed swiftly.
Akihiro SATOH Yutaka NAKAMURA Yutaka FUKUDA Daiki NOBAYASHI Takeshi IKENAGA
Computer networks are facing serious threats from the emergence of sophisticated new DGA bots. These DGA bots have their own dictionary, from which they concatenate words to dynamically generate domain names that are difficult to distinguish from human-generated domain names. In this letter, we propose an approach for identifying the callback communications of DGA bots based on relations among the words that constitute the character string of each domain name. Our evaluation indicates high performance, with a recall of 0.9977 and a precision of 0.9869.
Akihiro SATOH Yutaka NAKAMURA Takeshi IKENAGA
A dictionary attack against SSH is a common security threat. Many methods rely on network traffic to detect SSH dictionary attacks because the connections of remote login, file transfer, and TCP/IP forwarding are visibly distinct from those of attacks. However, these methods incorrectly judge the connections of automated operation tasks as those of attacks due to their mutual similarities. In this paper, we propose a new approach to identify user authentication methods on SSH connections and to remove connections that employ non-keystroke based authentication. This approach is based on two perspectives: (1) an SSH dictionary attack targets a host that provides keystroke based authentication; and (2) automated tasks through SSH need to support non-keystroke based authentication. Keystroke based authentication relies on a character string that is input by a human; in contrast, non-keystroke based authentication relies on information other than a character string. We evaluated the effectiveness of our approach through experiments on real network traffic at the edges in four campus networks, and the experimental results showed that our approach provides high identification accuracy with only a few errors.