Trusted Network Connect provides the functionality of the platform authentication and integrity verification which is crucial for enhancing the security of authentication protocols. However, applying this functionality directly to concrete authentications is susceptible to unknown attacks and efficiency degradation. In this paper, we propose TWMAP, a novel authentication protocol for WLAN Mesh networks in a trusted environment which completed the platform authentication and integrity verification during the user authentication. And, the Schnorr asymmetric signature scheme is utilized to reduce the overhead of the client. The security properties of the new protocol are examined using the Universally Composable Security model. The analytic comparisons and simulation results show that the new protocol is very efficient in both computing and communication costs.

Security and privacy of wireless sensor networks are key research issues recently. Most existing researches regarding wireless sensor networks security consider homogenous sensor networks. To achieve better security and performance, we adopt a heterogeneous wireless sensor network (HWSN) model that consists of physically different types of sensor nodes. This paper presents a secure message distribution scheme with configurable privacy for HWSNs, which takes advantage of powerful high-end sensor nodes. The scheme establishes a message distribution topology in an efficient and secure manner. The sensor node only need generate one signature for all the messages for all the users, which can greatly save the communication and computation cost of the sensor node. On the other hand, the user can only know the messages that let him know based on a pre-set policy, which can meet the requirement of the privacy. We show that the scheme has small bandwidth requirements and it is resilient against the node compromise attack.

Lee et al. recently proposed the first identity-based key agreement protocols for a multiple PKG environment where each PKG has different domain parameters in ICCSA 2005. However, this letter demonstrates that Lee et al.'s scheme does not include the property of implicit key authentication which is the fundamental security requirement, making it vulnerable to an impersonation attack.

Secure sensor localization is a prerequisite for many sensor networks to retrieve trustworthy data. However, most of existing node positioning systems were studied in trust environment and are therefore vulnerable to malicious attacks. In this work, we develop a robust node positioning mechanism(ROPM) to protect localization techniques from position attacks. Instead of introducing countermeasures for every possible internal or external attack, our approach aims at making node positioning system attack-tolerant by removing malicious beacons. We defeat internal attackers and external attackers by applying different strategies, which not only achieves robustness to attacks but also dramatically reduces the computation overhead. Finally, we provide detailed theoretical analysis and simulations to evaluate the proposed technique.