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[Keyword] DNSSEC(3hit)

1-3hit
  • A Client Based DNSSEC Validation System with Adaptive Alert Mechanism Considering Minimal Client Timeout

    Yong JIN  Kunitaka KAKOI  Nariyoshi YAMAI  Naoya KITAGAWA  Masahiko TOMOISHI  

     
    PAPER-Internet Security

      Pubricized:
    2017/05/18
      Vol:
    E100-D No:8
      Page(s):
    1751-1761

    The widespread usage of computers and communication networks affects people's social activities effectively in terms of intercommunication and the communication generally begins with domain name resolutions which are mainly provided by DNS (Domain Name System). Meanwhile, continuous cyber threats to DNS such as cache poisoning also affects computer networks critically. DNSSEC (DNS Security Extensions) is designed to provide secure name resolution between authoritative zone servers and DNS full resolvers. However high workload of DNSSEC validation on DNS full resolvers and complex key management on authoritative zone servers hinder its wide deployment. Moreover, querying clients use the name resolution results validated on DNS full resolvers, therefore they only get errors when DNSSEC validation fails or times out. In addition, name resolution failure can occur on querying clients due to technical and operational issues of DNSSEC. In this paper, we propose a client based DNSSEC validation system with adaptive alert mechanism considering minimal querying client timeout. The proposed system notifies the user of alert messages with answers even when the DNSSEC validation on the client fails or timeout so that the user can determine how to handle the received answers. We also implemented a prototype system and evaluated the features on a local experimental network as well as in the Internet. The contribution of this article is that the proposed system not only can mitigate the workload of DNS full resolvers but also can cover querying clients with secure name resolution, and by solving the existing operation issues in DNSSEC, it also can promote DNSSEC deployment.

  • UDP Large-Payload Capability Detection for DNSSEC

    Kenji RIKITAKE  Koji NAKAO  Shinji SHIMOJO  Hiroki NOGAWA  

     
    PAPER-Network Security

      Vol:
    E91-D No:5
      Page(s):
    1261-1273

    Domain Name System (DNS) is a major target for the network security attacks due to the weak authentication. A security extension DNSSEC has been proposed to introduce the public-key authentication, but it is still on the deployment phase. DNSSEC assumes IP fragmentation allowance for exchange of its messages over UDP large payloads. IP fragments are often blocked on network packet filters for administrative reasons, and the blockage may prevent fast exchange of DNSSEC messages. In this paper, we propose a scheme to detect the UDP large-payload transfer capability between two DNSSEC hosts. The proposed detection scheme does not require new protocol elements of DNS and DNSSEC, so it is applicable by solely modifying the application software and configuration. The scheme allows faster capability detection to probe the end-to-end communication capability between two DNS hosts by transferring a large UDP DNS message. The DNS software can choose the maximum transmission unit (MTU) on the application level using the probed detection results. Implementation test results show that the proposed scheme shortens the detection and transition time on fragment-blocked transports.

  • Preventing Child Neglect in DNSSECbis Using Lookaside Validation (DLV)

    Paul VIXIE  

     
    INVITED PAPER

      Vol:
    E88-B No:4
      Page(s):
    1326-1330

    The DNSSECbis data model has key introduction follow the delegation chain, thus requiring a zone's parent to become secure before a zone itself can be secured. Ultimately this leads to non-deployability since the root zone will probably not be secured any time soon. We describe an early deployment aid for DNSSECbis whereby key introduction can be done via cooperating third parties.