1-2hit |
Xinran LI Fang-Wei FU Xuan GUANG
FOX is a family of block ciphers published in 2004 and is famous for its provable security to cryptanalysis. In this paper, we present multiple 4-round impossible differentials and several new results of impossible differential attacks on 5,6,7-round FOX64 and 5-round FOX128 with the multiple differentials and the new early abort technique which shall reduce the data complexity and the time complexity respectively. In terms of the data complexity and the time complexity, our results are better than any of the previously known attacks.
Kexin QIAO Lei HU Siwei SUN Xiaoshuang MA Haibin KAN
Counting the number of differentially active S-boxes is of great importance in evaluating the security of a block cipher against differential attack. Mouha et al. proposed a technique based on Mixed-Integer Linear Programming (MILP) to automatically calculate a lower bound of the number of differentially active S-boxes for word-oriented block ciphers, and applied it to symmetric ciphers AES and Enocoro-128v2. Later Sun et al. extended the method by introducing bit-level representations for S-boxes and new constraints in the MILP problem, and applied the extended method to PRESENT-80 and LBlock. This kind of methods greatly depends on the constraints in the MILP problem describing the differential propagation of the block cipher. A more accurate description of the differential propagation leads to a tighter bound on the number of differentially active S-boxes. In this paper, we refine the constraints in the MILP problem describing XOR operations, and apply the refined MILP modeling to determine a lower bound of the number of active S-boxes for the Lai-Massey type block cipher FOX in the model of single-key differential attack, and obtain a tighter bound in FOX64 than existing results. Experimental results show that 6, instead of currently known 8, rounds of FOX64 is strong enough to resist against basic single-key differential attack since the differential characteristic probability is upper bounded by 2-64, and thus the maximum differential characteristic probability of 12-round FOX64 is upper bounded by 2-128, where 128 is the key-length of FOX64. We also get the lower bound of the number of differentially active S-boxes for 5-round FOX128, and proved the security of the full-round FOX128 with respect to single-key differential attack.