1-3hit |
Tao WANG Hongchang CHEN Chao QI
Software-defined networking (SDN) has rapidly emerged as a promising new technology for future networks and gained considerable attention from both academia and industry. However, due to the separation between the control plane and the data plane, the SDN controller can easily become the target of denial-of service (DoS) attacks. To mitigate DoS attacks in OpenFlow networks, our solution, MinDoS, contains two key techniques/modules: the simplified DoS detection module and the priority manager. The proposed architecture sends requests into multiple buffer queues with different priorities and then schedules the processing of these flow requests to ensure better controller protection. The results show that MinDoS is effective and adds only minor overhead to the entire SDN/OpenFlow infrastructure.
Hirose and Yoshida proposed an authenticated key agreement protocol based on the intractability of the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem. Recently, Hirose and Matsuura pointed out that Hirose and Yoshida's protocol is vulnerable to Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. And they proposed two key agreement protocols which are resistant to the DoS attacks. Their protocols are the first authenticated key agreement protocols resistant to both the storage exhaustion attack and the CPU exhaustion attack. In this paper we show that Hirose and Matsuura's DoS-resistant key agreement protocols and Hirose and Yoshida's key agreement protocol are vulnerable to impersonation attacks. We make suggestions for improvements.
In 2000, Sandirigama, Shimizu, and Noda proposed a simple password authentication scheme, SAS. However, SAS was later found to be flawed. Recently, Chen, Lee, Horng proposed two SAS-like schemes, which were claimed to be more secure than similar schemes. Herein, we show that both their schemes are still vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks. Additionally, Chen-Lee-Horng's second scheme is not easily reparable.