1-4hit |
Multisignatures are digital signatures for a group consisting of multiple signers where each signer signs common documents via interaction with its co-signers and the data size of the resultant signatures for the group is independent of the number of signers. In this work, we propose a multisignature scheme, whose security can be tightly reduced to the CDH problem in bilinear groups, in the strongest security model where nothing more is required than that each signer has a public key, i.e., the plain public key model. Loosely speaking, our main idea for a tight reduction is to utilize a three-round interaction in a full-domain hash construction. Namely, we surmise that a full-domain hash construction with three-round interaction will become tightly secure under the CDH problem. In addition, we show that the existing scheme by Zhou et al. (ISC 2011) can be improved to a construction with a tight security reduction as an application of our proof framework.
Yuichi KOMANO Kazuo OHTA Atsushi SHIMBO Shinichi KAWAMURA
We first model the formal security model of multisignature scheme following that of group signature scheme. Second, we prove that the following three probabilistic multisignature schemes based on a trapdoor permutation have tight security; PFDH (probabilistic full domain hash) based multisignature scheme (PFDH-MSS), PSS (probabilistic signature scheme) based multisignature scheme (PSS-MSS), and short signature PSS based multisignature scheme (S-PSS-MSS). Third, we give an optimal proof (general result) for multisignature schemes, which derives the lower bound for the length of random salt. We also estimate the upper bound for the length in each scheme and derive the optimal length of a random salt. Two of the schemes are promising in terms of security tightness and optimal signature length. In appendix, we describe a multisignature scheme using the claw-free permutation and discuss its security.
Chen et al. introduced a new notion of a concurrent signature scheme for a fair exchange of signatures with two parties. Chen et al. also proposed a concrete scheme and proved its security under the assumption of discrete logarithm problem. Recently, Hiwatari and Tanaka extended the concept of concurrent signature to many-to-one setting. Hiwatari and Tanaka also proposed a concrete scheme; however, it requires some strong assumption to achieve the fair exchange and it is not efficient. This paper gives another construction of concurrent signature for many-to-one setting with multisignature scheme. Hereafter, we call it (n,1) concurrent signature scheme. The proposed scheme is more efficient than the scheme of Hiwatari and Tanaka in computation complexity and signature size, and achieves the fair exchange without the assumption required for the scheme of Hiwatari and Tanaka. This paper also gives a construction for the fair exchange of signatures in many-to-many setting, called (n,m) concurrent signature scheme, in appendix.
Multisignature schemes enable us to integrate multiple signatures into a single short signature. In 2001, Mitomi and Miyaji proposed a general model of multisignatures, in which signed messages are flexible and the signing order is verifiable and flexible. Several schemes that satisfy these properties have been proposed, but to the best of our knowledge, their verifiable orders are limited to only sequential structures unlike some order-verifiable (but not message-flexible) multisignatures. We define a signing structure as a labeled tree, which can represent any natural signing order including series-parallel graphs, and formalize a general model of multisignatures that makes good use of our structure. We present a security model for such signatures, give the construction based on the general aggregate signature developed by Boneh et al., and provide a security proof in the random oracle model.