In 2002, Hwang, Lee, and Lai presented an attack on the untraceability property of Fan and Lei's partially blind signature scheme. In this letter, their attack is demonstrated as being invalid.

In a secure partially blind signature scheme, the signer assures that the blind signatures issued by him contains the information he desires. The techniques make it possible to minimize the unlimited growth of the bank's database which storing all spent electronic cash in an anonymous electronic cash system. In this paper we propose an efficient partially blind signature scheme for electronic cash. In our scheme, only several modular additions and modular multiplications are required for a signature requester to obtain and verify a signature. It turns out that the proposed scheme is suitable for mobile clients and smart-card applications because no time-consuming computations are required, such as modular exponentiation and inverse computations. Comparing with the existing blind signature schemes proposed in the literatures, our method reduces the amount of computations for signature requesters by almost 98%.