To offer location based services, service providers need to have access to Location Information (LI) regarding the users which they wish to serve; this is a potential privacy threat. We propose the use of constraints, i.e. statements limiting the use and distribution of LI, that are securely bound to the LI, as a means to reduce this threat. Constraints may themselves reveal information to any potential LI user--that is, the constraints themselves may also be a privacy threat. To address this problem we introduce the notion of a LI Preference Authority (LIPA). A LIPA is a trusted party which can examine LI constraints and make decisions about LI distribution without revealing the constraints to the entity requesting the LI. This is achieved by encrypting both the LI and the constraints with a LIPA encryption key, ensuring that the LI is only revealed at the discretion of the LIPA.
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Anand S. GAJPARIA, Chris J. MITCHELL, Chan Yeob YEUN, "Supporting User Privacy in Location Based Services" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications,
vol. E88-B, no. 7, pp. 2837-2847, July 2005, doi: 10.1093/ietcom/e88-b.7.2837.
Abstract: To offer location based services, service providers need to have access to Location Information (LI) regarding the users which they wish to serve; this is a potential privacy threat. We propose the use of constraints, i.e. statements limiting the use and distribution of LI, that are securely bound to the LI, as a means to reduce this threat. Constraints may themselves reveal information to any potential LI user--that is, the constraints themselves may also be a privacy threat. To address this problem we introduce the notion of a LI Preference Authority (LIPA). A LIPA is a trusted party which can examine LI constraints and make decisions about LI distribution without revealing the constraints to the entity requesting the LI. This is achieved by encrypting both the LI and the constraints with a LIPA encryption key, ensuring that the LI is only revealed at the discretion of the LIPA.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/communications/10.1093/ietcom/e88-b.7.2837/_p
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@ARTICLE{e88-b_7_2837,
author={Anand S. GAJPARIA, Chris J. MITCHELL, Chan Yeob YEUN, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications},
title={Supporting User Privacy in Location Based Services},
year={2005},
volume={E88-B},
number={7},
pages={2837-2847},
abstract={To offer location based services, service providers need to have access to Location Information (LI) regarding the users which they wish to serve; this is a potential privacy threat. We propose the use of constraints, i.e. statements limiting the use and distribution of LI, that are securely bound to the LI, as a means to reduce this threat. Constraints may themselves reveal information to any potential LI user--that is, the constraints themselves may also be a privacy threat. To address this problem we introduce the notion of a LI Preference Authority (LIPA). A LIPA is a trusted party which can examine LI constraints and make decisions about LI distribution without revealing the constraints to the entity requesting the LI. This is achieved by encrypting both the LI and the constraints with a LIPA encryption key, ensuring that the LI is only revealed at the discretion of the LIPA.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1093/ietcom/e88-b.7.2837},
ISSN={},
month={July},}
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TY - JOUR
TI - Supporting User Privacy in Location Based Services
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications
SP - 2837
EP - 2847
AU - Anand S. GAJPARIA
AU - Chris J. MITCHELL
AU - Chan Yeob YEUN
PY - 2005
DO - 10.1093/ietcom/e88-b.7.2837
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications
SN -
VL - E88-B
IS - 7
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications
Y1 - July 2005
AB - To offer location based services, service providers need to have access to Location Information (LI) regarding the users which they wish to serve; this is a potential privacy threat. We propose the use of constraints, i.e. statements limiting the use and distribution of LI, that are securely bound to the LI, as a means to reduce this threat. Constraints may themselves reveal information to any potential LI user--that is, the constraints themselves may also be a privacy threat. To address this problem we introduce the notion of a LI Preference Authority (LIPA). A LIPA is a trusted party which can examine LI constraints and make decisions about LI distribution without revealing the constraints to the entity requesting the LI. This is achieved by encrypting both the LI and the constraints with a LIPA encryption key, ensuring that the LI is only revealed at the discretion of the LIPA.
ER -