IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications
Illegal Interrogation Detectable Products Distribution Scheme in RFID-Enabled Supply Chains
Summary :
In RFID-enabled supply chains, it is necessary to protect the contents of EPCs (Electronic Product Code) since an EPC contains sensitive information such as the product code and serial number and could be used for counterfeits. Although many protection schemes have been proposed, no scheme can limit the number of illegal attempts for discovering EPCs or notice whether an attacker exists. In this paper, we propose an illegal interrogation detectable products distribution scheme for RFID-enabled supply chains. The idea is to detect the attacker by forcing him/her to access an authentication server. Our scheme masks EPCs with random sequences. Masked EPCs are written into genuine tags on products while random sequences are placed on an authentication server with an access code. An access code is divided into shares with a secret sharing scheme and they are written into genuine tags. We also write bogus shares into extra off-the-shelf tags that are not attached to any products. Since an attacker who wants to know genuine EPCs may obtain a large number of access code candidates and must try each on the authentication server, the server can detect the attacker.
- Publication
- IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications Vol.E99-B No.4 pp.820-829
- Publication Date
- 2016/04/01
- Publicized
- Online ISSN
- 1745-1345
- DOI
- 10.1587/transcom.2015ADP0008
- Type of Manuscript
- Special Section PAPER (Special Section on Autonomous Decentralized Systems Technologies and Applications for Next-Generation Social Infrastructure)
- Category
Authors
Kentaroh TOYODA
Keio University
Iwao SASASE
Keio University
Keyword
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Kentaroh TOYODA, Iwao SASASE, "Illegal Interrogation Detectable Products Distribution Scheme in RFID-Enabled Supply Chains" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications,
vol. E99-B, no. 4, pp. 820-829, April 2016, doi: 10.1587/transcom.2015ADP0008.
Abstract: In RFID-enabled supply chains, it is necessary to protect the contents of EPCs (Electronic Product Code) since an EPC contains sensitive information such as the product code and serial number and could be used for counterfeits. Although many protection schemes have been proposed, no scheme can limit the number of illegal attempts for discovering EPCs or notice whether an attacker exists. In this paper, we propose an illegal interrogation detectable products distribution scheme for RFID-enabled supply chains. The idea is to detect the attacker by forcing him/her to access an authentication server. Our scheme masks EPCs with random sequences. Masked EPCs are written into genuine tags on products while random sequences are placed on an authentication server with an access code. An access code is divided into shares with a secret sharing scheme and they are written into genuine tags. We also write bogus shares into extra off-the-shelf tags that are not attached to any products. Since an attacker who wants to know genuine EPCs may obtain a large number of access code candidates and must try each on the authentication server, the server can detect the attacker.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/communications/10.1587/transcom.2015ADP0008/_p
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@ARTICLE{e99-b_4_820,
author={Kentaroh TOYODA, Iwao SASASE, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications},
title={Illegal Interrogation Detectable Products Distribution Scheme in RFID-Enabled Supply Chains},
year={2016},
volume={E99-B},
number={4},
pages={820-829},
abstract={In RFID-enabled supply chains, it is necessary to protect the contents of EPCs (Electronic Product Code) since an EPC contains sensitive information such as the product code and serial number and could be used for counterfeits. Although many protection schemes have been proposed, no scheme can limit the number of illegal attempts for discovering EPCs or notice whether an attacker exists. In this paper, we propose an illegal interrogation detectable products distribution scheme for RFID-enabled supply chains. The idea is to detect the attacker by forcing him/her to access an authentication server. Our scheme masks EPCs with random sequences. Masked EPCs are written into genuine tags on products while random sequences are placed on an authentication server with an access code. An access code is divided into shares with a secret sharing scheme and they are written into genuine tags. We also write bogus shares into extra off-the-shelf tags that are not attached to any products. Since an attacker who wants to know genuine EPCs may obtain a large number of access code candidates and must try each on the authentication server, the server can detect the attacker.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transcom.2015ADP0008},
ISSN={1745-1345},
month={April},}
Copy
TY - JOUR
TI - Illegal Interrogation Detectable Products Distribution Scheme in RFID-Enabled Supply Chains
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications
SP - 820
EP - 829
AU - Kentaroh TOYODA
AU - Iwao SASASE
PY - 2016
DO - 10.1587/transcom.2015ADP0008
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications
SN - 1745-1345
VL - E99-B
IS - 4
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications
Y1 - April 2016
AB - In RFID-enabled supply chains, it is necessary to protect the contents of EPCs (Electronic Product Code) since an EPC contains sensitive information such as the product code and serial number and could be used for counterfeits. Although many protection schemes have been proposed, no scheme can limit the number of illegal attempts for discovering EPCs or notice whether an attacker exists. In this paper, we propose an illegal interrogation detectable products distribution scheme for RFID-enabled supply chains. The idea is to detect the attacker by forcing him/her to access an authentication server. Our scheme masks EPCs with random sequences. Masked EPCs are written into genuine tags on products while random sequences are placed on an authentication server with an access code. An access code is divided into shares with a secret sharing scheme and they are written into genuine tags. We also write bogus shares into extra off-the-shelf tags that are not attached to any products. Since an attacker who wants to know genuine EPCs may obtain a large number of access code candidates and must try each on the authentication server, the server can detect the attacker.
ER -
English
