IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications
Cooperative Resource Pricing in Service Overlay Networks for Mobile Agents
Summary :
The success of peer-to-peer overlay networks depends on cooperation among participating peers. In this paper, we investigate the degree of cooperation among individual peers required to induce globally favorable properties in an overlay network. Specifically, we consider a resource pricing problem in a market-oriented overlay network where participating peers sell own resources (e.g., CPU cycles) to earn energy which represents some money or rewards in the network. In the resource pricing model presented in this paper, each peer sets the price for own resource based on the degree of cooperation; non-cooperative peers attempt to maximize their own energy gains, while cooperative peers maximize the sum of own and neighbors' energy gains. Simulation results are presented to demonstrate that the network topology is an important factor influencing the minimum degree of cooperation required to increase the network-wide global energy gain.
- Publication
- IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications Vol.E93-B No.7 pp.1927-1930
- Publication Date
- 2010/07/01
- Publicized
- Online ISSN
- 1745-1345
- DOI
- 10.1587/transcom.E93.B.1927
- Type of Manuscript
- LETTER
- Category
- Network
Authors
Keyword
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Tadashi NAKANO, Yutaka OKAIE, "Cooperative Resource Pricing in Service Overlay Networks for Mobile Agents" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications,
vol. E93-B, no. 7, pp. 1927-1930, July 2010, doi: 10.1587/transcom.E93.B.1927.
Abstract: The success of peer-to-peer overlay networks depends on cooperation among participating peers. In this paper, we investigate the degree of cooperation among individual peers required to induce globally favorable properties in an overlay network. Specifically, we consider a resource pricing problem in a market-oriented overlay network where participating peers sell own resources (e.g., CPU cycles) to earn energy which represents some money or rewards in the network. In the resource pricing model presented in this paper, each peer sets the price for own resource based on the degree of cooperation; non-cooperative peers attempt to maximize their own energy gains, while cooperative peers maximize the sum of own and neighbors' energy gains. Simulation results are presented to demonstrate that the network topology is an important factor influencing the minimum degree of cooperation required to increase the network-wide global energy gain.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/communications/10.1587/transcom.E93.B.1927/_p
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@ARTICLE{e93-b_7_1927,
author={Tadashi NAKANO, Yutaka OKAIE, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications},
title={Cooperative Resource Pricing in Service Overlay Networks for Mobile Agents},
year={2010},
volume={E93-B},
number={7},
pages={1927-1930},
abstract={The success of peer-to-peer overlay networks depends on cooperation among participating peers. In this paper, we investigate the degree of cooperation among individual peers required to induce globally favorable properties in an overlay network. Specifically, we consider a resource pricing problem in a market-oriented overlay network where participating peers sell own resources (e.g., CPU cycles) to earn energy which represents some money or rewards in the network. In the resource pricing model presented in this paper, each peer sets the price for own resource based on the degree of cooperation; non-cooperative peers attempt to maximize their own energy gains, while cooperative peers maximize the sum of own and neighbors' energy gains. Simulation results are presented to demonstrate that the network topology is an important factor influencing the minimum degree of cooperation required to increase the network-wide global energy gain.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transcom.E93.B.1927},
ISSN={1745-1345},
month={July},}
Copy
TY - JOUR
TI - Cooperative Resource Pricing in Service Overlay Networks for Mobile Agents
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications
SP - 1927
EP - 1930
AU - Tadashi NAKANO
AU - Yutaka OKAIE
PY - 2010
DO - 10.1587/transcom.E93.B.1927
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications
SN - 1745-1345
VL - E93-B
IS - 7
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications
Y1 - July 2010
AB - The success of peer-to-peer overlay networks depends on cooperation among participating peers. In this paper, we investigate the degree of cooperation among individual peers required to induce globally favorable properties in an overlay network. Specifically, we consider a resource pricing problem in a market-oriented overlay network where participating peers sell own resources (e.g., CPU cycles) to earn energy which represents some money or rewards in the network. In the resource pricing model presented in this paper, each peer sets the price for own resource based on the degree of cooperation; non-cooperative peers attempt to maximize their own energy gains, while cooperative peers maximize the sum of own and neighbors' energy gains. Simulation results are presented to demonstrate that the network topology is an important factor influencing the minimum degree of cooperation required to increase the network-wide global energy gain.
ER -
English
