In this letter, an AGV based relay selection mechanism is developed to ensure relays reporting true information in wireless relay networks. The source selects relays based on the channel state information (CSI) of relay-destination links. Selfish relays may report fake CSI in order to obtain a better chance of being selected, whereas the source is not able to tell the reported in real or in false. In the proposed scheme, a relay node receives some payoffs from the destination with respect to the achievable data rate and also some compensations from the others in terms of the reported CSI of all relays. This mechanism not only enforces truth-telling upon relay nodes with maximum payoff but also ensures fairness among them. The equilibrium of payoff is attained when relay nodes report their true CSI. Simulation results demonstrate the theoretical solutions.
The copyright of the original papers published on this site belongs to IEICE. Unauthorized use of the original or translated papers is prohibited. See IEICE Provisions on Copyright for details.
Copy
Jinglei LI, Qinghai YANG, Kyung Sup KWAK, Fenglin FU, "Game Theoretic Approach for Enforcing Truth-Telling upon Relay Nodes" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications,
vol. E94-B, no. 5, pp. 1483-1486, May 2011, doi: 10.1587/transcom.E94.B.1483.
Abstract: In this letter, an AGV based relay selection mechanism is developed to ensure relays reporting true information in wireless relay networks. The source selects relays based on the channel state information (CSI) of relay-destination links. Selfish relays may report fake CSI in order to obtain a better chance of being selected, whereas the source is not able to tell the reported in real or in false. In the proposed scheme, a relay node receives some payoffs from the destination with respect to the achievable data rate and also some compensations from the others in terms of the reported CSI of all relays. This mechanism not only enforces truth-telling upon relay nodes with maximum payoff but also ensures fairness among them. The equilibrium of payoff is attained when relay nodes report their true CSI. Simulation results demonstrate the theoretical solutions.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/communications/10.1587/transcom.E94.B.1483/_p
Copy
@ARTICLE{e94-b_5_1483,
author={Jinglei LI, Qinghai YANG, Kyung Sup KWAK, Fenglin FU, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications},
title={Game Theoretic Approach for Enforcing Truth-Telling upon Relay Nodes},
year={2011},
volume={E94-B},
number={5},
pages={1483-1486},
abstract={In this letter, an AGV based relay selection mechanism is developed to ensure relays reporting true information in wireless relay networks. The source selects relays based on the channel state information (CSI) of relay-destination links. Selfish relays may report fake CSI in order to obtain a better chance of being selected, whereas the source is not able to tell the reported in real or in false. In the proposed scheme, a relay node receives some payoffs from the destination with respect to the achievable data rate and also some compensations from the others in terms of the reported CSI of all relays. This mechanism not only enforces truth-telling upon relay nodes with maximum payoff but also ensures fairness among them. The equilibrium of payoff is attained when relay nodes report their true CSI. Simulation results demonstrate the theoretical solutions.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transcom.E94.B.1483},
ISSN={1745-1345},
month={May},}
Copy
TY - JOUR
TI - Game Theoretic Approach for Enforcing Truth-Telling upon Relay Nodes
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications
SP - 1483
EP - 1486
AU - Jinglei LI
AU - Qinghai YANG
AU - Kyung Sup KWAK
AU - Fenglin FU
PY - 2011
DO - 10.1587/transcom.E94.B.1483
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications
SN - 1745-1345
VL - E94-B
IS - 5
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications
Y1 - May 2011
AB - In this letter, an AGV based relay selection mechanism is developed to ensure relays reporting true information in wireless relay networks. The source selects relays based on the channel state information (CSI) of relay-destination links. Selfish relays may report fake CSI in order to obtain a better chance of being selected, whereas the source is not able to tell the reported in real or in false. In the proposed scheme, a relay node receives some payoffs from the destination with respect to the achievable data rate and also some compensations from the others in terms of the reported CSI of all relays. This mechanism not only enforces truth-telling upon relay nodes with maximum payoff but also ensures fairness among them. The equilibrium of payoff is attained when relay nodes report their true CSI. Simulation results demonstrate the theoretical solutions.
ER -