Complexity of Differential Attacks on SHA-0 with Various Message Schedules

Mitsuhiro HATTORI; Shoichi HIROSE; Susumu YOSHIDA

doi:10.1093/ietfec/e88-a.12.3668

Complexity of Differential Attacks on SHA-0 with Various Message Schedules

Mitsuhiro HATTORI, Shoichi HIROSE, Susumu YOSHIDA

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The security of SHA-0 with various message schedules is discussed in this letter. SHA-0 employs a primitive polynomial of degree 16 over GF(2) in its message schedule. For each primitive polynomial, a SHA-0 variant can be constructed. The collision resistance and the near-collision resistance of SHA-0 variants to the Chabaud-Joux attack are evaluated. Moreover, the near-collision resistance of a variant to the Biham-Chen attack is evaluated. It is shown that the selection of primitive polynomials highly affects the resistance. However, it is concluded that these SHA-0 variants are not appropriate for making SHA-0 secure.

Publication: IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals Vol.E88-A No.12 pp.3668-3671

Publication Date: 2005/12/01

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DOI: 10.1093/ietfec/e88-a.12.3668

Type of Manuscript: LETTER

Category: Information Security

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Mitsuhiro HATTORI, Shoichi HIROSE, Susumu YOSHIDA, "Complexity of Differential Attacks on SHA-0 with Various Message Schedules" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals, vol. E88-A, no. 12, pp. 3668-3671, December 2005, doi: 10.1093/ietfec/e88-a.12.3668.
Abstract: The security of SHA-0 with various message schedules is discussed in this letter. SHA-0 employs a primitive polynomial of degree 16 over GF(2) in its message schedule. For each primitive polynomial, a SHA-0 variant can be constructed. The collision resistance and the near-collision resistance of SHA-0 variants to the Chabaud-Joux attack are evaluated. Moreover, the near-collision resistance of a variant to the Biham-Chen attack is evaluated. It is shown that the selection of primitive polynomials highly affects the resistance. However, it is concluded that these SHA-0 variants are not appropriate for making SHA-0 secure.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1093/ietfec/e88-a.12.3668/_p

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@ARTICLE{e88-a_12_3668,
author={Mitsuhiro HATTORI, Shoichi HIROSE, Susumu YOSHIDA, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Complexity of Differential Attacks on SHA-0 with Various Message Schedules},
year={2005},
volume={E88-A},
number={12},
pages={3668-3671},
abstract={The security of SHA-0 with various message schedules is discussed in this letter. SHA-0 employs a primitive polynomial of degree 16 over GF(2) in its message schedule. For each primitive polynomial, a SHA-0 variant can be constructed. The collision resistance and the near-collision resistance of SHA-0 variants to the Chabaud-Joux attack are evaluated. Moreover, the near-collision resistance of a variant to the Biham-Chen attack is evaluated. It is shown that the selection of primitive polynomials highly affects the resistance. However, it is concluded that these SHA-0 variants are not appropriate for making SHA-0 secure.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1093/ietfec/e88-a.12.3668},
ISSN={},
month={December},}

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TY - JOUR
TI - Complexity of Differential Attacks on SHA-0 with Various Message Schedules
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 3668
EP - 3671
AU - Mitsuhiro HATTORI
AU - Shoichi HIROSE
AU - Susumu YOSHIDA
PY - 2005
DO - 10.1093/ietfec/e88-a.12.3668
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN -
VL - E88-A
IS - 12
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - December 2005
AB - The security of SHA-0 with various message schedules is discussed in this letter. SHA-0 employs a primitive polynomial of degree 16 over GF(2) in its message schedule. For each primitive polynomial, a SHA-0 variant can be constructed. The collision resistance and the near-collision resistance of SHA-0 variants to the Chabaud-Joux attack are evaluated. Moreover, the near-collision resistance of a variant to the Biham-Chen attack is evaluated. It is shown that the selection of primitive polynomials highly affects the resistance. However, it is concluded that these SHA-0 variants are not appropriate for making SHA-0 secure.
ER -