Security Analysis of the SPA-Resistant Fractional Width Method

Katsuyuki OKEYA; Tsuyoshi TAKAGI; Camille VUILLAUME

doi:10.1093/ietfec/e89-a.1.161

Security Analysis of the SPA-Resistant Fractional Width Method

Katsuyuki OKEYA, Tsuyoshi TAKAGI, Camille VUILLAUME

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Elliptic curves offer interesting possibilities for alternative cryptosystems, especially in constrained environments like smartcards. However, cryptographic routines running on such lightweight devices can be attacked with the help of "side channel information"; power consumption, for instance. Elliptic curve cryptosystems are not an exception: if no precaution is taken, power traces can help attackers to reveal secret information stored in tamper-resistant devices. Okeya-Takagi scheme (OT scheme) is an efficient countermeasure against such attacks on elliptic curve cryptosystems, which has the unique feature to allow any size for the pre-computed table: depending on how much memory is available, users can flexibly change the table size to fit their needs. Since the nature of OT scheme is different from other side-channel attack countermeasures, it is necessary to deeply investigate its security. In this paper, we present a comprehensive security analysis of OT scheme, and show that based on information leaked by power consumption traces, attackers can slightly enhance standard attacks. Then, we explain how to prevent such information leakage with simple and efficient modifications.

Publication: IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals Vol.E89-A No.1 pp.161-168

Publication Date: 2006/01/01

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Online ISSN: 1745-1337

DOI: 10.1093/ietfec/e89-a.1.161

Type of Manuscript: Special Section PAPER (Special Section on Cryptography and Information Security)

Category: Elliptic Curve Cryptography

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Katsuyuki OKEYA, Tsuyoshi TAKAGI, Camille VUILLAUME, "Security Analysis of the SPA-Resistant Fractional Width Method" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals, vol. E89-A, no. 1, pp. 161-168, January 2006, doi: 10.1093/ietfec/e89-a.1.161.
Abstract: Elliptic curves offer interesting possibilities for alternative cryptosystems, especially in constrained environments like smartcards. However, cryptographic routines running on such lightweight devices can be attacked with the help of "side channel information"; power consumption, for instance. Elliptic curve cryptosystems are not an exception: if no precaution is taken, power traces can help attackers to reveal secret information stored in tamper-resistant devices. Okeya-Takagi scheme (OT scheme) is an efficient countermeasure against such attacks on elliptic curve cryptosystems, which has the unique feature to allow any size for the pre-computed table: depending on how much memory is available, users can flexibly change the table size to fit their needs. Since the nature of OT scheme is different from other side-channel attack countermeasures, it is necessary to deeply investigate its security. In this paper, we present a comprehensive security analysis of OT scheme, and show that based on information leaked by power consumption traces, attackers can slightly enhance standard attacks. Then, we explain how to prevent such information leakage with simple and efficient modifications.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1093/ietfec/e89-a.1.161/_p

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@ARTICLE{e89-a_1_161,
author={Katsuyuki OKEYA, Tsuyoshi TAKAGI, Camille VUILLAUME, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Security Analysis of the SPA-Resistant Fractional Width Method},
year={2006},
volume={E89-A},
number={1},
pages={161-168},
abstract={Elliptic curves offer interesting possibilities for alternative cryptosystems, especially in constrained environments like smartcards. However, cryptographic routines running on such lightweight devices can be attacked with the help of "side channel information"; power consumption, for instance. Elliptic curve cryptosystems are not an exception: if no precaution is taken, power traces can help attackers to reveal secret information stored in tamper-resistant devices. Okeya-Takagi scheme (OT scheme) is an efficient countermeasure against such attacks on elliptic curve cryptosystems, which has the unique feature to allow any size for the pre-computed table: depending on how much memory is available, users can flexibly change the table size to fit their needs. Since the nature of OT scheme is different from other side-channel attack countermeasures, it is necessary to deeply investigate its security. In this paper, we present a comprehensive security analysis of OT scheme, and show that based on information leaked by power consumption traces, attackers can slightly enhance standard attacks. Then, we explain how to prevent such information leakage with simple and efficient modifications.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1093/ietfec/e89-a.1.161},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={January},}

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TY - JOUR
TI - Security Analysis of the SPA-Resistant Fractional Width Method
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 161
EP - 168
AU - Katsuyuki OKEYA
AU - Tsuyoshi TAKAGI
AU - Camille VUILLAUME
PY - 2006
DO - 10.1093/ietfec/e89-a.1.161
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E89-A
IS - 1
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - January 2006
AB - Elliptic curves offer interesting possibilities for alternative cryptosystems, especially in constrained environments like smartcards. However, cryptographic routines running on such lightweight devices can be attacked with the help of "side channel information"; power consumption, for instance. Elliptic curve cryptosystems are not an exception: if no precaution is taken, power traces can help attackers to reveal secret information stored in tamper-resistant devices. Okeya-Takagi scheme (OT scheme) is an efficient countermeasure against such attacks on elliptic curve cryptosystems, which has the unique feature to allow any size for the pre-computed table: depending on how much memory is available, users can flexibly change the table size to fit their needs. Since the nature of OT scheme is different from other side-channel attack countermeasures, it is necessary to deeply investigate its security. In this paper, we present a comprehensive security analysis of OT scheme, and show that based on information leaked by power consumption traces, attackers can slightly enhance standard attacks. Then, we explain how to prevent such information leakage with simple and efficient modifications.
ER -