IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Multi-Population Replicator Dynamics with Erroneous Perceptions
Summary :
In evolutionary game theory, to the best of our knowledge, individuals' perceptions have not been taken into consideration explicitly. When an individual interacts with the other individual under coexistence of heterogeneous sub-populations, the individual may be willing to change his/her strategy depending on the sub-population the other individual belongs to. Moreover, in such a situation, each individual may make an error about the sub-population the other individual belongs to. In this paper, we propose a multi-population model with such erroneous perceptions. We define an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) and formulate replicator dynamics in this model, and prove several properties of the proposed model. Moreover, we focus on a two-population chicken game with erroneous perceptions and discuss characteristics of equilibrium points of its replicator dynamics.
- Publication
- IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals Vol.E89-A No.10 pp.2857-2865
- Publication Date
- 2006/10/01
- Publicized
- Online ISSN
- 1745-1337
- DOI
- 10.1093/ietfec/e89-a.10.2857
- Type of Manuscript
- PAPER
- Category
- Nonlinear Problems
Authors
Keyword
Latest Issue
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Takafumi KANAZAWA, Toshimitsu USHIO, "Multi-Population Replicator Dynamics with Erroneous Perceptions" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E89-A, no. 10, pp. 2857-2865, October 2006, doi: 10.1093/ietfec/e89-a.10.2857.
Abstract: In evolutionary game theory, to the best of our knowledge, individuals' perceptions have not been taken into consideration explicitly. When an individual interacts with the other individual under coexistence of heterogeneous sub-populations, the individual may be willing to change his/her strategy depending on the sub-population the other individual belongs to. Moreover, in such a situation, each individual may make an error about the sub-population the other individual belongs to. In this paper, we propose a multi-population model with such erroneous perceptions. We define an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) and formulate replicator dynamics in this model, and prove several properties of the proposed model. Moreover, we focus on a two-population chicken game with erroneous perceptions and discuss characteristics of equilibrium points of its replicator dynamics.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1093/ietfec/e89-a.10.2857/_p
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@ARTICLE{e89-a_10_2857,
author={Takafumi KANAZAWA, Toshimitsu USHIO, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Multi-Population Replicator Dynamics with Erroneous Perceptions},
year={2006},
volume={E89-A},
number={10},
pages={2857-2865},
abstract={In evolutionary game theory, to the best of our knowledge, individuals' perceptions have not been taken into consideration explicitly. When an individual interacts with the other individual under coexistence of heterogeneous sub-populations, the individual may be willing to change his/her strategy depending on the sub-population the other individual belongs to. Moreover, in such a situation, each individual may make an error about the sub-population the other individual belongs to. In this paper, we propose a multi-population model with such erroneous perceptions. We define an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) and formulate replicator dynamics in this model, and prove several properties of the proposed model. Moreover, we focus on a two-population chicken game with erroneous perceptions and discuss characteristics of equilibrium points of its replicator dynamics.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1093/ietfec/e89-a.10.2857},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={October},}
Copy
TY - JOUR
TI - Multi-Population Replicator Dynamics with Erroneous Perceptions
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 2857
EP - 2865
AU - Takafumi KANAZAWA
AU - Toshimitsu USHIO
PY - 2006
DO - 10.1093/ietfec/e89-a.10.2857
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E89-A
IS - 10
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - October 2006
AB - In evolutionary game theory, to the best of our knowledge, individuals' perceptions have not been taken into consideration explicitly. When an individual interacts with the other individual under coexistence of heterogeneous sub-populations, the individual may be willing to change his/her strategy depending on the sub-population the other individual belongs to. Moreover, in such a situation, each individual may make an error about the sub-population the other individual belongs to. In this paper, we propose a multi-population model with such erroneous perceptions. We define an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) and formulate replicator dynamics in this model, and prove several properties of the proposed model. Moreover, we focus on a two-population chicken game with erroneous perceptions and discuss characteristics of equilibrium points of its replicator dynamics.
ER -
English
