IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Forgery of Provable Secure Short Signcryption Scheme
Summary :
In this paper, we analyse Ma signcryption scheme [4] proposed in Inscrypt'2006. Although Ma signcryption scheme [4] is probably secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks and forgery, we show that Ma signcryption scheme is easily forgeable by the receiver and the receiver can impersonate the sender to forge any valid signcryption to any receiver.
- Publication
- IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals Vol.E90-A No.9 pp.1879-1880
- Publication Date
- 2007/09/01
- Publicized
- Online ISSN
- 1745-1337
- DOI
- 10.1093/ietfec/e90-a.9.1879
- Type of Manuscript
- Special Section LETTER (Special Section on Information Theory and Its Applications)
- Category
Authors
Keyword
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Chik-How TAN, "Forgery of Provable Secure Short Signcryption Scheme" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E90-A, no. 9, pp. 1879-1880, September 2007, doi: 10.1093/ietfec/e90-a.9.1879.
Abstract: In this paper, we analyse Ma signcryption scheme [4] proposed in Inscrypt'2006. Although Ma signcryption scheme [4] is probably secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks and forgery, we show that Ma signcryption scheme is easily forgeable by the receiver and the receiver can impersonate the sender to forge any valid signcryption to any receiver.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1093/ietfec/e90-a.9.1879/_p
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@ARTICLE{e90-a_9_1879,
author={Chik-How TAN, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Forgery of Provable Secure Short Signcryption Scheme},
year={2007},
volume={E90-A},
number={9},
pages={1879-1880},
abstract={In this paper, we analyse Ma signcryption scheme [4] proposed in Inscrypt'2006. Although Ma signcryption scheme [4] is probably secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks and forgery, we show that Ma signcryption scheme is easily forgeable by the receiver and the receiver can impersonate the sender to forge any valid signcryption to any receiver.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1093/ietfec/e90-a.9.1879},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={September},}
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TY - JOUR
TI - Forgery of Provable Secure Short Signcryption Scheme
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 1879
EP - 1880
AU - Chik-How TAN
PY - 2007
DO - 10.1093/ietfec/e90-a.9.1879
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E90-A
IS - 9
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - September 2007
AB - In this paper, we analyse Ma signcryption scheme [4] proposed in Inscrypt'2006. Although Ma signcryption scheme [4] is probably secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks and forgery, we show that Ma signcryption scheme is easily forgeable by the receiver and the receiver can impersonate the sender to forge any valid signcryption to any receiver.
ER -
English
