In recent years, some countermeasures have been proposed against differential power analysis (DPA) at the basic composition element level of logic circuits. We propose a countermeasure named random switching logic (RSL). RSL involves computation with data masking using a single logic gate and suppression of transient transitions using ENABLE signals generated independently of input data. Recently, some countermeasures that were proposed against DPA, such as MRSL and DRSL, adopted the concept of RSL. Although MRSL is based on RSL, it uses a different method to suppress the transient transitions. DRSL uses RSL to avoid the possibility of leakage caused by a difference in delays occurring in MDPL that combines dual-rail circuits with random masking. The important difference between these countermeasures and RSL is that they can vary the output transition timing depending on the input data patterns. In this paper, we focus on this feature to evaluate the DPA resistance of MRSL and DRSL. Experiments are also conducted on DPA resistance by using an FPGA to verify the evaluation results. It is confirmed that in both MRSL and DRSL, there is a possibility of leakage if a sufficient difference in delays exists in input signals.
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Minoru SAEKI, Daisuke SUZUKI, "Security Evaluations of MRSL and DRSL Considering Signal Delays" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E91-A, no. 1, pp. 176-183, January 2008, doi: 10.1093/ietfec/e91-a.1.176.
Abstract: In recent years, some countermeasures have been proposed against differential power analysis (DPA) at the basic composition element level of logic circuits. We propose a countermeasure named random switching logic (RSL). RSL involves computation with data masking using a single logic gate and suppression of transient transitions using ENABLE signals generated independently of input data. Recently, some countermeasures that were proposed against DPA, such as MRSL and DRSL, adopted the concept of RSL. Although MRSL is based on RSL, it uses a different method to suppress the transient transitions. DRSL uses RSL to avoid the possibility of leakage caused by a difference in delays occurring in MDPL that combines dual-rail circuits with random masking. The important difference between these countermeasures and RSL is that they can vary the output transition timing depending on the input data patterns. In this paper, we focus on this feature to evaluate the DPA resistance of MRSL and DRSL. Experiments are also conducted on DPA resistance by using an FPGA to verify the evaluation results. It is confirmed that in both MRSL and DRSL, there is a possibility of leakage if a sufficient difference in delays exists in input signals.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1093/ietfec/e91-a.1.176/_p
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@ARTICLE{e91-a_1_176,
author={Minoru SAEKI, Daisuke SUZUKI, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Security Evaluations of MRSL and DRSL Considering Signal Delays},
year={2008},
volume={E91-A},
number={1},
pages={176-183},
abstract={In recent years, some countermeasures have been proposed against differential power analysis (DPA) at the basic composition element level of logic circuits. We propose a countermeasure named random switching logic (RSL). RSL involves computation with data masking using a single logic gate and suppression of transient transitions using ENABLE signals generated independently of input data. Recently, some countermeasures that were proposed against DPA, such as MRSL and DRSL, adopted the concept of RSL. Although MRSL is based on RSL, it uses a different method to suppress the transient transitions. DRSL uses RSL to avoid the possibility of leakage caused by a difference in delays occurring in MDPL that combines dual-rail circuits with random masking. The important difference between these countermeasures and RSL is that they can vary the output transition timing depending on the input data patterns. In this paper, we focus on this feature to evaluate the DPA resistance of MRSL and DRSL. Experiments are also conducted on DPA resistance by using an FPGA to verify the evaluation results. It is confirmed that in both MRSL and DRSL, there is a possibility of leakage if a sufficient difference in delays exists in input signals.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1093/ietfec/e91-a.1.176},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={January},}
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TY - JOUR
TI - Security Evaluations of MRSL and DRSL Considering Signal Delays
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 176
EP - 183
AU - Minoru SAEKI
AU - Daisuke SUZUKI
PY - 2008
DO - 10.1093/ietfec/e91-a.1.176
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E91-A
IS - 1
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - January 2008
AB - In recent years, some countermeasures have been proposed against differential power analysis (DPA) at the basic composition element level of logic circuits. We propose a countermeasure named random switching logic (RSL). RSL involves computation with data masking using a single logic gate and suppression of transient transitions using ENABLE signals generated independently of input data. Recently, some countermeasures that were proposed against DPA, such as MRSL and DRSL, adopted the concept of RSL. Although MRSL is based on RSL, it uses a different method to suppress the transient transitions. DRSL uses RSL to avoid the possibility of leakage caused by a difference in delays occurring in MDPL that combines dual-rail circuits with random masking. The important difference between these countermeasures and RSL is that they can vary the output transition timing depending on the input data patterns. In this paper, we focus on this feature to evaluate the DPA resistance of MRSL and DRSL. Experiments are also conducted on DPA resistance by using an FPGA to verify the evaluation results. It is confirmed that in both MRSL and DRSL, there is a possibility of leakage if a sufficient difference in delays exists in input signals.
ER -