Message Authentication Codes and Differential Attack

Kazuo OHTA; Mitsuru MATSUI

Message Authentication Codes and Differential Attack

Kazuo OHTA, Mitsuru MATSUI

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We discuss the security of Message Authentication Code (MAC) schemes from the viewpoint of differential attack, and propose an attack that is effective against DES-MAC and FEAL-MAC. The attack derives the secret authentication key in the chosen plaintext scenario. For example, DES(8-round)-MAC can be broken with 2³⁴ pairs of plaintext, while FEAL8-MAC can be broken with 2²² pairs. The proposed attack is applicable to any MAC scheme, even if the 32-bits are randomly selected from among the 64-bits of ciphertext generated by a cryptosystem vulnerable to differential attack in the chosen plaintext scenario.

Publication: IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals Vol.E77-A No.1 pp.8-14

Publication Date: 1994/01/25

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Type of Manuscript: Special Section PAPER (Special Section on Cryptography and Information Security)

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Kazuo OHTA
Mitsuru MATSUI

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Kazuo OHTA, Mitsuru MATSUI, "Message Authentication Codes and Differential Attack" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals, vol. E77-A, no. 1, pp. 8-14, January 1994, doi: .
Abstract: We discuss the security of Message Authentication Code (MAC) schemes from the viewpoint of differential attack, and propose an attack that is effective against DES-MAC and FEAL-MAC. The attack derives the secret authentication key in the chosen plaintext scenario. For example, DES(8-round)-MAC can be broken with 2³⁴ pairs of plaintext, while FEAL8-MAC can be broken with 2²² pairs. The proposed attack is applicable to any MAC scheme, even if the 32-bits are randomly selected from among the 64-bits of ciphertext generated by a cryptosystem vulnerable to differential attack in the chosen plaintext scenario.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/e77-a_1_8/_p

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@ARTICLE{e77-a_1_8,
author={Kazuo OHTA, Mitsuru MATSUI, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Message Authentication Codes and Differential Attack},
year={1994},
volume={E77-A},
number={1},
pages={8-14},
abstract={We discuss the security of Message Authentication Code (MAC) schemes from the viewpoint of differential attack, and propose an attack that is effective against DES-MAC and FEAL-MAC. The attack derives the secret authentication key in the chosen plaintext scenario. For example, DES(8-round)-MAC can be broken with 2³⁴ pairs of plaintext, while FEAL8-MAC can be broken with 2²² pairs. The proposed attack is applicable to any MAC scheme, even if the 32-bits are randomly selected from among the 64-bits of ciphertext generated by a cryptosystem vulnerable to differential attack in the chosen plaintext scenario.},
keywords={},
doi={},
ISSN={},
month={January},}

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TY - JOUR
TI - Message Authentication Codes and Differential Attack
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 8
EP - 14
AU - Kazuo OHTA
AU - Mitsuru MATSUI
PY - 1994
DO -
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN -
VL - E77-A
IS - 1
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - January 1994
AB - We discuss the security of Message Authentication Code (MAC) schemes from the viewpoint of differential attack, and propose an attack that is effective against DES-MAC and FEAL-MAC. The attack derives the secret authentication key in the chosen plaintext scenario. For example, DES(8-round)-MAC can be broken with 2³⁴ pairs of plaintext, while FEAL8-MAC can be broken with 2²² pairs. The proposed attack is applicable to any MAC scheme, even if the 32-bits are randomly selected from among the 64-bits of ciphertext generated by a cryptosystem vulnerable to differential attack in the chosen plaintext scenario.
ER -