For improving the RSA cryptosystem, more desirable conditions on key structures have been intensively studied. Recently, M.J.Wiener presented a cryptanalytic attack on the use of small RSA secret exponents. To be secure against the Wiener's attack, the size of a secret exponent d should be chosen more than one-quarter of the size of the modulus n = pq (in bits). Besides, it is more desirable, in frequent cases, to make the public exponent e as small as possible. However if small d is chosen first, in such case as the digital signature system with smart card, the size of e is inevitably increased to that of n when we use the conventional key generation algorithm. This paper presents a new algorithm, Algorithm I, for generating of the secure RSA keys against Wiener's attack. With Algorithm I, it is possible to choose the smaller sizes of the RSA exponents under certain conditions on key parameters. For example, with Algorithm I, we can construct the RSA keys with the public exponent e of two-thirds and secret exponent d of one-third of the size of modulus n (in bits). Furthermore we present a modified version of Algorithm I, Algorithm II, for generating of the strong RSA keys having the difficulty of factoring n. Finally we analyze the performances of Algorithm I and Algorithm II.
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Ryuichi SAKAI, Masakatu MORII, Masao KASAHARA, "New Key Generation Algorithm for RSA Cryptosystem" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E77-A, no. 1, pp. 89-97, January 1994, doi: .
Abstract: For improving the RSA cryptosystem, more desirable conditions on key structures have been intensively studied. Recently, M.J.Wiener presented a cryptanalytic attack on the use of small RSA secret exponents. To be secure against the Wiener's attack, the size of a secret exponent d should be chosen more than one-quarter of the size of the modulus n = pq (in bits). Besides, it is more desirable, in frequent cases, to make the public exponent e as small as possible. However if small d is chosen first, in such case as the digital signature system with smart card, the size of e is inevitably increased to that of n when we use the conventional key generation algorithm. This paper presents a new algorithm, Algorithm I, for generating of the secure RSA keys against Wiener's attack. With Algorithm I, it is possible to choose the smaller sizes of the RSA exponents under certain conditions on key parameters. For example, with Algorithm I, we can construct the RSA keys with the public exponent e of two-thirds and secret exponent d of one-third of the size of modulus n (in bits). Furthermore we present a modified version of Algorithm I, Algorithm II, for generating of the strong RSA keys having the difficulty of factoring n. Finally we analyze the performances of Algorithm I and Algorithm II.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/e77-a_1_89/_p
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@ARTICLE{e77-a_1_89,
author={Ryuichi SAKAI, Masakatu MORII, Masao KASAHARA, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={New Key Generation Algorithm for RSA Cryptosystem},
year={1994},
volume={E77-A},
number={1},
pages={89-97},
abstract={For improving the RSA cryptosystem, more desirable conditions on key structures have been intensively studied. Recently, M.J.Wiener presented a cryptanalytic attack on the use of small RSA secret exponents. To be secure against the Wiener's attack, the size of a secret exponent d should be chosen more than one-quarter of the size of the modulus n = pq (in bits). Besides, it is more desirable, in frequent cases, to make the public exponent e as small as possible. However if small d is chosen first, in such case as the digital signature system with smart card, the size of e is inevitably increased to that of n when we use the conventional key generation algorithm. This paper presents a new algorithm, Algorithm I, for generating of the secure RSA keys against Wiener's attack. With Algorithm I, it is possible to choose the smaller sizes of the RSA exponents under certain conditions on key parameters. For example, with Algorithm I, we can construct the RSA keys with the public exponent e of two-thirds and secret exponent d of one-third of the size of modulus n (in bits). Furthermore we present a modified version of Algorithm I, Algorithm II, for generating of the strong RSA keys having the difficulty of factoring n. Finally we analyze the performances of Algorithm I and Algorithm II.},
keywords={},
doi={},
ISSN={},
month={January},}
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TY - JOUR
TI - New Key Generation Algorithm for RSA Cryptosystem
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 89
EP - 97
AU - Ryuichi SAKAI
AU - Masakatu MORII
AU - Masao KASAHARA
PY - 1994
DO -
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN -
VL - E77-A
IS - 1
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - January 1994
AB - For improving the RSA cryptosystem, more desirable conditions on key structures have been intensively studied. Recently, M.J.Wiener presented a cryptanalytic attack on the use of small RSA secret exponents. To be secure against the Wiener's attack, the size of a secret exponent d should be chosen more than one-quarter of the size of the modulus n = pq (in bits). Besides, it is more desirable, in frequent cases, to make the public exponent e as small as possible. However if small d is chosen first, in such case as the digital signature system with smart card, the size of e is inevitably increased to that of n when we use the conventional key generation algorithm. This paper presents a new algorithm, Algorithm I, for generating of the secure RSA keys against Wiener's attack. With Algorithm I, it is possible to choose the smaller sizes of the RSA exponents under certain conditions on key parameters. For example, with Algorithm I, we can construct the RSA keys with the public exponent e of two-thirds and secret exponent d of one-third of the size of modulus n (in bits). Furthermore we present a modified version of Algorithm I, Algorithm II, for generating of the strong RSA keys having the difficulty of factoring n. Finally we analyze the performances of Algorithm I and Algorithm II.
ER -