Differential-Linear Cryptanalysis of FEAL-8
Summary :
In CRYPTO '94, Langford and Hellman attacked DES reduced to 8-round in the chosen plaintext scenario by their "differential-1inear cryptanalysis," which is a combination of differential cryptanalysis and linear cryptanalysis. In this paper, a historical review of differential-linear cryptanalysis, our formalization of differential-linear cryptanalysis, and the application of differential-linear cryptanalysis to FEAL-8 are presented. As a result, though the previous best method (differential cryptanalysis) required 128 chosen plaintexts, only 12 chosen plaintexts are sufficient, in computer experimentations, to attack FEAL-8.
- Publication
- IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals Vol.E79-A No.1 pp.20-27
- Publication Date
- 1996/01/25
- Publicized
- Online ISSN
- DOI
- Type of Manuscript
- Special Section PAPER (Special Section on Cryptography and Information Security)
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Kazumaro AOKI, Kazuo OHTA, "Differential-Linear Cryptanalysis of FEAL-8" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E79-A, no. 1, pp. 20-27, January 1996, doi: .
Abstract: In CRYPTO '94, Langford and Hellman attacked DES reduced to 8-round in the chosen plaintext scenario by their "differential-1inear cryptanalysis," which is a combination of differential cryptanalysis and linear cryptanalysis. In this paper, a historical review of differential-linear cryptanalysis, our formalization of differential-linear cryptanalysis, and the application of differential-linear cryptanalysis to FEAL-8 are presented. As a result, though the previous best method (differential cryptanalysis) required 128 chosen plaintexts, only 12 chosen plaintexts are sufficient, in computer experimentations, to attack FEAL-8.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/e79-a_1_20/_p
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@ARTICLE{e79-a_1_20,
author={Kazumaro AOKI, Kazuo OHTA, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Differential-Linear Cryptanalysis of FEAL-8},
year={1996},
volume={E79-A},
number={1},
pages={20-27},
abstract={In CRYPTO '94, Langford and Hellman attacked DES reduced to 8-round in the chosen plaintext scenario by their "differential-1inear cryptanalysis," which is a combination of differential cryptanalysis and linear cryptanalysis. In this paper, a historical review of differential-linear cryptanalysis, our formalization of differential-linear cryptanalysis, and the application of differential-linear cryptanalysis to FEAL-8 are presented. As a result, though the previous best method (differential cryptanalysis) required 128 chosen plaintexts, only 12 chosen plaintexts are sufficient, in computer experimentations, to attack FEAL-8.},
keywords={},
doi={},
ISSN={},
month={January},}
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TY - JOUR
TI - Differential-Linear Cryptanalysis of FEAL-8
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 20
EP - 27
AU - Kazumaro AOKI
AU - Kazuo OHTA
PY - 1996
DO -
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN -
VL - E79-A
IS - 1
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - January 1996
AB - In CRYPTO '94, Langford and Hellman attacked DES reduced to 8-round in the chosen plaintext scenario by their "differential-1inear cryptanalysis," which is a combination of differential cryptanalysis and linear cryptanalysis. In this paper, a historical review of differential-linear cryptanalysis, our formalization of differential-linear cryptanalysis, and the application of differential-linear cryptanalysis to FEAL-8 are presented. As a result, though the previous best method (differential cryptanalysis) required 128 chosen plaintexts, only 12 chosen plaintexts are sufficient, in computer experimentations, to attack FEAL-8.
ER -
English
