We show that under some conditions an attacker can break the public-key cryptosystem proposed by J. Schwenk and J. Eisfeld at Eurocrypt '96 which is based on the difficulty of factoring over the ring Z/nZ [x], even though its security is as intractable as the difficulty of factoring a rational integer. We apply attacks previously reported against RSA-type cryptosystems with a low exponent to the Schwenk-Eisfeld cryptosystem and show a method of breaking the Schwenk-Eisfeld signature with a low exponent.
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Tsuyoshi TAKAGI, Shozo NAITO, "Low Exponent Attacks against the Schwenk-Eisfeld Cryptoscheme and Signature" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E81-A, no. 3, pp. 483-488, March 1998, doi: .
Abstract: We show that under some conditions an attacker can break the public-key cryptosystem proposed by J. Schwenk and J. Eisfeld at Eurocrypt '96 which is based on the difficulty of factoring over the ring Z/nZ [x], even though its security is as intractable as the difficulty of factoring a rational integer. We apply attacks previously reported against RSA-type cryptosystems with a low exponent to the Schwenk-Eisfeld cryptosystem and show a method of breaking the Schwenk-Eisfeld signature with a low exponent.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/e81-a_3_483/_p
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@ARTICLE{e81-a_3_483,
author={Tsuyoshi TAKAGI, Shozo NAITO, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Low Exponent Attacks against the Schwenk-Eisfeld Cryptoscheme and Signature},
year={1998},
volume={E81-A},
number={3},
pages={483-488},
abstract={We show that under some conditions an attacker can break the public-key cryptosystem proposed by J. Schwenk and J. Eisfeld at Eurocrypt '96 which is based on the difficulty of factoring over the ring Z/nZ [x], even though its security is as intractable as the difficulty of factoring a rational integer. We apply attacks previously reported against RSA-type cryptosystems with a low exponent to the Schwenk-Eisfeld cryptosystem and show a method of breaking the Schwenk-Eisfeld signature with a low exponent.},
keywords={},
doi={},
ISSN={},
month={March},}
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TY - JOUR
TI - Low Exponent Attacks against the Schwenk-Eisfeld Cryptoscheme and Signature
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 483
EP - 488
AU - Tsuyoshi TAKAGI
AU - Shozo NAITO
PY - 1998
DO -
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN -
VL - E81-A
IS - 3
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - March 1998
AB - We show that under some conditions an attacker can break the public-key cryptosystem proposed by J. Schwenk and J. Eisfeld at Eurocrypt '96 which is based on the difficulty of factoring over the ring Z/nZ [x], even though its security is as intractable as the difficulty of factoring a rational integer. We apply attacks previously reported against RSA-type cryptosystems with a low exponent to the Schwenk-Eisfeld cryptosystem and show a method of breaking the Schwenk-Eisfeld signature with a low exponent.
ER -