IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Security of E2 against Truncated Differential Cryptanalysis
Summary :
This paper evaluates the security of the block cipher E2 against truncated differential cryptanalysis. We show an algorithm to search for effective truncated differentials. The result of the search confirmed that there exist no truncated differentials that lead to possible attacks for E2 with more than 8 rounds. The best attack breaks an 8-round variant of E2 with either IT-Function (the initial transformation) or FT-Function (the final transformation) using 294 chosen plaintexts. We also found the attack which distinguishes a 7-round variant of E2 with IT- and FT-Functions from a random permutation using 291 chosen plaintexts.
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- IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals Vol.E84-A No.1 pp.319-325
- Publication Date
- 2001/01/01
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- Special Section PAPER (Special Section on Cryptography and Information Security)
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Shiho MORIAI, Makoto SUGITA, Masayuki KANDA, "Security of E2 against Truncated Differential Cryptanalysis" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E84-A, no. 1, pp. 319-325, January 2001, doi: .
Abstract: This paper evaluates the security of the block cipher E2 against truncated differential cryptanalysis. We show an algorithm to search for effective truncated differentials. The result of the search confirmed that there exist no truncated differentials that lead to possible attacks for E2 with more than 8 rounds. The best attack breaks an 8-round variant of E2 with either IT-Function (the initial transformation) or FT-Function (the final transformation) using 294 chosen plaintexts. We also found the attack which distinguishes a 7-round variant of E2 with IT- and FT-Functions from a random permutation using 291 chosen plaintexts.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/e84-a_1_319/_p
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@ARTICLE{e84-a_1_319,
author={Shiho MORIAI, Makoto SUGITA, Masayuki KANDA, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Security of E2 against Truncated Differential Cryptanalysis},
year={2001},
volume={E84-A},
number={1},
pages={319-325},
abstract={This paper evaluates the security of the block cipher E2 against truncated differential cryptanalysis. We show an algorithm to search for effective truncated differentials. The result of the search confirmed that there exist no truncated differentials that lead to possible attacks for E2 with more than 8 rounds. The best attack breaks an 8-round variant of E2 with either IT-Function (the initial transformation) or FT-Function (the final transformation) using 294 chosen plaintexts. We also found the attack which distinguishes a 7-round variant of E2 with IT- and FT-Functions from a random permutation using 291 chosen plaintexts.},
keywords={},
doi={},
ISSN={},
month={January},}
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TY - JOUR
TI - Security of E2 against Truncated Differential Cryptanalysis
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 319
EP - 325
AU - Shiho MORIAI
AU - Makoto SUGITA
AU - Masayuki KANDA
PY - 2001
DO -
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN -
VL - E84-A
IS - 1
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - January 2001
AB - This paper evaluates the security of the block cipher E2 against truncated differential cryptanalysis. We show an algorithm to search for effective truncated differentials. The result of the search confirmed that there exist no truncated differentials that lead to possible attacks for E2 with more than 8 rounds. The best attack breaks an 8-round variant of E2 with either IT-Function (the initial transformation) or FT-Function (the final transformation) using 294 chosen plaintexts. We also found the attack which distinguishes a 7-round variant of E2 with IT- and FT-Functions from a random permutation using 291 chosen plaintexts.
ER -
English
