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Various attacks against RC5 have been analyzed intensively. A known plaintext attack has not been reported that it works on so higher round as a chosen plaintext attack, but it can work more efficiently and practically. In this paper, we investigate a known plaintext attack against RC5 by improving a correlation attack. As for a known plaintext attack against RC5, the best known result is a linear cryptanalysis. They have reported that RC5-32 with 10 rounds can be broken by 2^{64} plaintexts under the heuristic assumption: RC5-32 with *r* rounds can be broken with a success probability of 90% by using 2^{6r+4} plaintexts. However, their assumption seems to be highly optimistic. Our known plaintext correlation attack can break RC5-32 with 10 rounds (20 half-rounds) in a more strict sense with a success probability of 90% by using 2^{63.67} plaintexts. Furthermore, our attack can break RC5-32 with 21 half-rounds in a success probability of 30% by using 2^{63.07} plaintexts.

- Publication
- IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals Vol.E85-A No.1 pp.44-57

- Publication Date
- 2002/01/01

- Publicized

- Online ISSN

- DOI

- Type of Manuscript
- Special Section PAPER (Special Section on Cryptography and Information Security)

- Category

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Atsuko MIYAJI, Masao NONAKA, Yoshinori TAKII, "Improved Correlation Attack on RC5" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E85-A, no. 1, pp. 44-57, January 2002, doi: .

Abstract: Various attacks against RC5 have been analyzed intensively. A known plaintext attack has not been reported that it works on so higher round as a chosen plaintext attack, but it can work more efficiently and practically. In this paper, we investigate a known plaintext attack against RC5 by improving a correlation attack. As for a known plaintext attack against RC5, the best known result is a linear cryptanalysis. They have reported that RC5-32 with 10 rounds can be broken by 2^{64} plaintexts under the heuristic assumption: RC5-32 with *r* rounds can be broken with a success probability of 90% by using 2^{6r+4} plaintexts. However, their assumption seems to be highly optimistic. Our known plaintext correlation attack can break RC5-32 with 10 rounds (20 half-rounds) in a more strict sense with a success probability of 90% by using 2^{63.67} plaintexts. Furthermore, our attack can break RC5-32 with 21 half-rounds in a success probability of 30% by using 2^{63.07} plaintexts.

URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/e85-a_1_44/_p

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@ARTICLE{e85-a_1_44,

author={Atsuko MIYAJI, Masao NONAKA, Yoshinori TAKII, },

journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},

title={Improved Correlation Attack on RC5},

year={2002},

volume={E85-A},

number={1},

pages={44-57},

abstract={Various attacks against RC5 have been analyzed intensively. A known plaintext attack has not been reported that it works on so higher round as a chosen plaintext attack, but it can work more efficiently and practically. In this paper, we investigate a known plaintext attack against RC5 by improving a correlation attack. As for a known plaintext attack against RC5, the best known result is a linear cryptanalysis. They have reported that RC5-32 with 10 rounds can be broken by 2^{64} plaintexts under the heuristic assumption: RC5-32 with *r* rounds can be broken with a success probability of 90% by using 2^{6r+4} plaintexts. However, their assumption seems to be highly optimistic. Our known plaintext correlation attack can break RC5-32 with 10 rounds (20 half-rounds) in a more strict sense with a success probability of 90% by using 2^{63.67} plaintexts. Furthermore, our attack can break RC5-32 with 21 half-rounds in a success probability of 30% by using 2^{63.07} plaintexts.},

keywords={},

doi={},

ISSN={},

month={January},}

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TY - JOUR

TI - Improved Correlation Attack on RC5

T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals

SP - 44

EP - 57

AU - Atsuko MIYAJI

AU - Masao NONAKA

AU - Yoshinori TAKII

PY - 2002

DO -

JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals

SN -

VL - E85-A

IS - 1

JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals

Y1 - January 2002

AB - Various attacks against RC5 have been analyzed intensively. A known plaintext attack has not been reported that it works on so higher round as a chosen plaintext attack, but it can work more efficiently and practically. In this paper, we investigate a known plaintext attack against RC5 by improving a correlation attack. As for a known plaintext attack against RC5, the best known result is a linear cryptanalysis. They have reported that RC5-32 with 10 rounds can be broken by 2^{64} plaintexts under the heuristic assumption: RC5-32 with *r* rounds can be broken with a success probability of 90% by using 2^{6r+4} plaintexts. However, their assumption seems to be highly optimistic. Our known plaintext correlation attack can break RC5-32 with 10 rounds (20 half-rounds) in a more strict sense with a success probability of 90% by using 2^{63.67} plaintexts. Furthermore, our attack can break RC5-32 with 21 half-rounds in a success probability of 30% by using 2^{63.07} plaintexts.

ER -