Improved Correlation Attack on RC5

Atsuko MIYAJI; Masao NONAKA; Yoshinori TAKII

Improved Correlation Attack on RC5

Atsuko MIYAJI, Masao NONAKA, Yoshinori TAKII

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Various attacks against RC5 have been analyzed intensively. A known plaintext attack has not been reported that it works on so higher round as a chosen plaintext attack, but it can work more efficiently and practically. In this paper, we investigate a known plaintext attack against RC5 by improving a correlation attack. As for a known plaintext attack against RC5, the best known result is a linear cryptanalysis. They have reported that RC5-32 with 10 rounds can be broken by 2⁶⁴ plaintexts under the heuristic assumption: RC5-32 with r rounds can be broken with a success probability of 90% by using 2^6r+4 plaintexts. However, their assumption seems to be highly optimistic. Our known plaintext correlation attack can break RC5-32 with 10 rounds (20 half-rounds) in a more strict sense with a success probability of 90% by using 2^63.67 plaintexts. Furthermore, our attack can break RC5-32 with 21 half-rounds in a success probability of 30% by using 2^63.07 plaintexts.

Publication: IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals Vol.E85-A No.1 pp.44-57

Publication Date: 2002/01/01

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Type of Manuscript: Special Section PAPER (Special Section on Cryptography and Information Security)

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Atsuko MIYAJI, Masao NONAKA, Yoshinori TAKII, "Improved Correlation Attack on RC5" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals, vol. E85-A, no. 1, pp. 44-57, January 2002, doi: .
Abstract: Various attacks against RC5 have been analyzed intensively. A known plaintext attack has not been reported that it works on so higher round as a chosen plaintext attack, but it can work more efficiently and practically. In this paper, we investigate a known plaintext attack against RC5 by improving a correlation attack. As for a known plaintext attack against RC5, the best known result is a linear cryptanalysis. They have reported that RC5-32 with 10 rounds can be broken by 2⁶⁴ plaintexts under the heuristic assumption: RC5-32 with r rounds can be broken with a success probability of 90% by using 2^6r+4 plaintexts. However, their assumption seems to be highly optimistic. Our known plaintext correlation attack can break RC5-32 with 10 rounds (20 half-rounds) in a more strict sense with a success probability of 90% by using 2^63.67 plaintexts. Furthermore, our attack can break RC5-32 with 21 half-rounds in a success probability of 30% by using 2^63.07 plaintexts.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/e85-a_1_44/_p

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@ARTICLE{e85-a_1_44,
author={Atsuko MIYAJI, Masao NONAKA, Yoshinori TAKII, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Improved Correlation Attack on RC5},
year={2002},
volume={E85-A},
number={1},
pages={44-57},
abstract={Various attacks against RC5 have been analyzed intensively. A known plaintext attack has not been reported that it works on so higher round as a chosen plaintext attack, but it can work more efficiently and practically. In this paper, we investigate a known plaintext attack against RC5 by improving a correlation attack. As for a known plaintext attack against RC5, the best known result is a linear cryptanalysis. They have reported that RC5-32 with 10 rounds can be broken by 2⁶⁴ plaintexts under the heuristic assumption: RC5-32 with r rounds can be broken with a success probability of 90% by using 2^6r+4 plaintexts. However, their assumption seems to be highly optimistic. Our known plaintext correlation attack can break RC5-32 with 10 rounds (20 half-rounds) in a more strict sense with a success probability of 90% by using 2^63.67 plaintexts. Furthermore, our attack can break RC5-32 with 21 half-rounds in a success probability of 30% by using 2^63.07 plaintexts.},
keywords={},
doi={},
ISSN={},
month={January},}

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TY - JOUR
TI - Improved Correlation Attack on RC5
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 44
EP - 57
AU - Atsuko MIYAJI
AU - Masao NONAKA
AU - Yoshinori TAKII
PY - 2002
DO -
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN -
VL - E85-A
IS - 1
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - January 2002
AB - Various attacks against RC5 have been analyzed intensively. A known plaintext attack has not been reported that it works on so higher round as a chosen plaintext attack, but it can work more efficiently and practically. In this paper, we investigate a known plaintext attack against RC5 by improving a correlation attack. As for a known plaintext attack against RC5, the best known result is a linear cryptanalysis. They have reported that RC5-32 with 10 rounds can be broken by 2⁶⁴ plaintexts under the heuristic assumption: RC5-32 with r rounds can be broken with a success probability of 90% by using 2^6r+4 plaintexts. However, their assumption seems to be highly optimistic. Our known plaintext correlation attack can break RC5-32 with 10 rounds (20 half-rounds) in a more strict sense with a success probability of 90% by using 2^63.67 plaintexts. Furthermore, our attack can break RC5-32 with 21 half-rounds in a success probability of 30% by using 2^63.07 plaintexts.
ER -