Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round RC6 without Whitening

Atsuko MIYAJI; Masao NONAKA

Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round RC6 without Whitening

Atsuko MIYAJI, Masao NONAKA

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We investigate the cryptanalysis of reduced-round RC6 without whitening. Up to now, key recovery algorithms against the reduced-round RC6 itself, the reduced-round RC6 without whitening, and even the simplified variants have been infeasible on a modern computer. In this paper, we propose an efficient and feasible key recovery algorithm against reduced-round RC6 without whitening. Our algorithm is very useful for analyzing the security of the round-function of RC6. Our attack applies to a rather large number of rounds. RC6 without whitening with r rounds can be broken with a success probability of 90% by using 2^{8.1r - 13.8} plaintexts. Therefore, our attack can break RC6 without whitening with 17 rounds by using 2^123.9 plaintexts with a probability of 90%.

Publication: IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals Vol.E86-A No.1 pp.19-30

Publication Date: 2003/01/01

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Type of Manuscript: Special Section PAPER (Special Section on Cryptography and Information Security)

Category: Symmetric Ciphers and Hash Functions

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Atsuko MIYAJI, Masao NONAKA, "Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round RC6 without Whitening" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals, vol. E86-A, no. 1, pp. 19-30, January 2003, doi: .
Abstract: We investigate the cryptanalysis of reduced-round RC6 without whitening. Up to now, key recovery algorithms against the reduced-round RC6 itself, the reduced-round RC6 without whitening, and even the simplified variants have been infeasible on a modern computer. In this paper, we propose an efficient and feasible key recovery algorithm against reduced-round RC6 without whitening. Our algorithm is very useful for analyzing the security of the round-function of RC6. Our attack applies to a rather large number of rounds. RC6 without whitening with r rounds can be broken with a success probability of 90% by using 2^{8.1r - 13.8} plaintexts. Therefore, our attack can break RC6 without whitening with 17 rounds by using 2^123.9 plaintexts with a probability of 90%.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/e86-a_1_19/_p

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@ARTICLE{e86-a_1_19,
author={Atsuko MIYAJI, Masao NONAKA, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round RC6 without Whitening},
year={2003},
volume={E86-A},
number={1},
pages={19-30},
abstract={We investigate the cryptanalysis of reduced-round RC6 without whitening. Up to now, key recovery algorithms against the reduced-round RC6 itself, the reduced-round RC6 without whitening, and even the simplified variants have been infeasible on a modern computer. In this paper, we propose an efficient and feasible key recovery algorithm against reduced-round RC6 without whitening. Our algorithm is very useful for analyzing the security of the round-function of RC6. Our attack applies to a rather large number of rounds. RC6 without whitening with r rounds can be broken with a success probability of 90% by using 2^{8.1r - 13.8} plaintexts. Therefore, our attack can break RC6 without whitening with 17 rounds by using 2^123.9 plaintexts with a probability of 90%.},
keywords={},
doi={},
ISSN={},
month={January},}

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TY - JOUR
TI - Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round RC6 without Whitening
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 19
EP - 30
AU - Atsuko MIYAJI
AU - Masao NONAKA
PY - 2003
DO -
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN -
VL - E86-A
IS - 1
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - January 2003
AB - We investigate the cryptanalysis of reduced-round RC6 without whitening. Up to now, key recovery algorithms against the reduced-round RC6 itself, the reduced-round RC6 without whitening, and even the simplified variants have been infeasible on a modern computer. In this paper, we propose an efficient and feasible key recovery algorithm against reduced-round RC6 without whitening. Our algorithm is very useful for analyzing the security of the round-function of RC6. Our attack applies to a rather large number of rounds. RC6 without whitening with r rounds can be broken with a success probability of 90% by using 2^{8.1r - 13.8} plaintexts. Therefore, our attack can break RC6 without whitening with 17 rounds by using 2^123.9 plaintexts with a probability of 90%.
ER -