IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
A Study on Higher Order Differential Attack of Camellia
Summary :
The encryption algorithm Camellia is a 128 bit block cipher proposed by NTT and Mitsubishi, Japan. Since the algebraic degree of the outputs after 3 rounds is greater than 128, designers estimate that it is impossible to attack Camellia by higher order differential. In this paper, we show a new higher order differential attack which controls the value of differential using proper fixed value of plaintext. As the result, we found that 6-round F-function can be attacked using 8th order differentials. The attack requires 217 chosen plaintexts and 222 F-function operations. Our computer simulation took about 2 seconds for the attack. If we take 2-R elimination algorithm, 7-round F-function will be attacked using 8th order differentials. This attack requires 219 chosen plaintexts and 264 F-function operations, which is less than exhaustive search for 128 bit key.
- Publication
- IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals Vol.E86-A No.1 pp.31-36
- Publication Date
- 2003/01/01
- Publicized
- Online ISSN
- DOI
- Type of Manuscript
- Special Section PAPER (Special Section on Cryptography and Information Security)
- Category
- Symmetric Ciphers and Hash Functions
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Takeshi KAWABATA, Masaki TAKEDA, Toshinobu KANEKO, "A Study on Higher Order Differential Attack of Camellia" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E86-A, no. 1, pp. 31-36, January 2003, doi: .
Abstract: The encryption algorithm Camellia is a 128 bit block cipher proposed by NTT and Mitsubishi, Japan. Since the algebraic degree of the outputs after 3 rounds is greater than 128, designers estimate that it is impossible to attack Camellia by higher order differential. In this paper, we show a new higher order differential attack which controls the value of differential using proper fixed value of plaintext. As the result, we found that 6-round F-function can be attacked using 8th order differentials. The attack requires 217 chosen plaintexts and 222 F-function operations. Our computer simulation took about 2 seconds for the attack. If we take 2-R elimination algorithm, 7-round F-function will be attacked using 8th order differentials. This attack requires 219 chosen plaintexts and 264 F-function operations, which is less than exhaustive search for 128 bit key.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/e86-a_1_31/_p
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@ARTICLE{e86-a_1_31,
author={Takeshi KAWABATA, Masaki TAKEDA, Toshinobu KANEKO, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={A Study on Higher Order Differential Attack of Camellia},
year={2003},
volume={E86-A},
number={1},
pages={31-36},
abstract={The encryption algorithm Camellia is a 128 bit block cipher proposed by NTT and Mitsubishi, Japan. Since the algebraic degree of the outputs after 3 rounds is greater than 128, designers estimate that it is impossible to attack Camellia by higher order differential. In this paper, we show a new higher order differential attack which controls the value of differential using proper fixed value of plaintext. As the result, we found that 6-round F-function can be attacked using 8th order differentials. The attack requires 217 chosen plaintexts and 222 F-function operations. Our computer simulation took about 2 seconds for the attack. If we take 2-R elimination algorithm, 7-round F-function will be attacked using 8th order differentials. This attack requires 219 chosen plaintexts and 264 F-function operations, which is less than exhaustive search for 128 bit key.},
keywords={},
doi={},
ISSN={},
month={January},}
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TY - JOUR
TI - A Study on Higher Order Differential Attack of Camellia
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 31
EP - 36
AU - Takeshi KAWABATA
AU - Masaki TAKEDA
AU - Toshinobu KANEKO
PY - 2003
DO -
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN -
VL - E86-A
IS - 1
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - January 2003
AB - The encryption algorithm Camellia is a 128 bit block cipher proposed by NTT and Mitsubishi, Japan. Since the algebraic degree of the outputs after 3 rounds is greater than 128, designers estimate that it is impossible to attack Camellia by higher order differential. In this paper, we show a new higher order differential attack which controls the value of differential using proper fixed value of plaintext. As the result, we found that 6-round F-function can be attacked using 8th order differentials. The attack requires 217 chosen plaintexts and 222 F-function operations. Our computer simulation took about 2 seconds for the attack. If we take 2-R elimination algorithm, 7-round F-function will be attacked using 8th order differentials. This attack requires 219 chosen plaintexts and 264 F-function operations, which is less than exhaustive search for 128 bit key.
ER -
English
