Density Attack to the Knapsack Cryptosystems with Enumerative Source Encoding
Summary :
We analyze the Lagarias-Odlyzko low-density attack precisely, and show that this low-density attack can be applied to the Chor-Rivest and the Okamoto-Tanaka-Uchiyama cryptosystemes, which are considered to be secure against the low-density attack. According to our analysis, these schemes turn out to be no longer secure against the low-density attack.
- Publication
- IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals Vol.E87-A No.6 pp.1564-1569
- Publication Date
- 2004/06/01
- Publicized
- Online ISSN
- DOI
- Type of Manuscript
- PAPER
- Category
- Information Security
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Keiji OMURA, Keisuke TANAKA, "Density Attack to the Knapsack Cryptosystems with Enumerative Source Encoding" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E87-A, no. 6, pp. 1564-1569, June 2004, doi: .
Abstract: We analyze the Lagarias-Odlyzko low-density attack precisely, and show that this low-density attack can be applied to the Chor-Rivest and the Okamoto-Tanaka-Uchiyama cryptosystemes, which are considered to be secure against the low-density attack. According to our analysis, these schemes turn out to be no longer secure against the low-density attack.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/e87-a_6_1564/_p
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@ARTICLE{e87-a_6_1564,
author={Keiji OMURA, Keisuke TANAKA, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Density Attack to the Knapsack Cryptosystems with Enumerative Source Encoding},
year={2004},
volume={E87-A},
number={6},
pages={1564-1569},
abstract={We analyze the Lagarias-Odlyzko low-density attack precisely, and show that this low-density attack can be applied to the Chor-Rivest and the Okamoto-Tanaka-Uchiyama cryptosystemes, which are considered to be secure against the low-density attack. According to our analysis, these schemes turn out to be no longer secure against the low-density attack.},
keywords={},
doi={},
ISSN={},
month={June},}
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TY - JOUR
TI - Density Attack to the Knapsack Cryptosystems with Enumerative Source Encoding
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 1564
EP - 1569
AU - Keiji OMURA
AU - Keisuke TANAKA
PY - 2004
DO -
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN -
VL - E87-A
IS - 6
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - June 2004
AB - We analyze the Lagarias-Odlyzko low-density attack precisely, and show that this low-density attack can be applied to the Chor-Rivest and the Okamoto-Tanaka-Uchiyama cryptosystemes, which are considered to be secure against the low-density attack. According to our analysis, these schemes turn out to be no longer secure against the low-density attack.
ER -
English
