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The demand response is attracting attention to perform electric power load leveling. In this paper, we consider a power consumption reduction problem with an aggregator that requests electric power consumption reduction to consumers by allocating a part of its profit to them as an incentive. We formulate interactions among consumers as a game, where the incentive to each consumer is determined by his/her contribution to the total power consumption reduction, and the consumer determines his/her own reduction amount selfishly to maximize his/her payoff. The uniqueness of best responses of each consumer and an equilibrium condition of the game are also derived. By using numerical simulations, we show relationship among incentive allocation rate, realized total reduction amount through the game, and the aggregator's payoff for the cases with the for-profit and the nonprofit aggregator.

- Publication
- IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals Vol.E103-A No.2 pp.390-397

- Publication Date
- 2020/02/01

- Publicized

- Online ISSN
- 1745-1337

- DOI
- 10.1587/transfun.2019MAI0001

- Type of Manuscript
- Special Section INVITED PAPER (Special Section on Mathematical Systems Science and its Applications)

- Category

Yuta HASEGAWA

Osaka University

Takafumi KANAZAWA

Osaka University

The copyright of the original papers published on this site belongs to IEICE. Unauthorized use of the original or translated papers is prohibited. See IEICE Provisions on Copyright for details.

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Yuta HASEGAWA, Takafumi KANAZAWA, "Game Theoretic Analysis of Incentive-Based Power Consumption Reduction Problems with For-Profit or Nonprofit Aggregator" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E103-A, no. 2, pp. 390-397, February 2020, doi: 10.1587/transfun.2019MAI0001.

Abstract: The demand response is attracting attention to perform electric power load leveling. In this paper, we consider a power consumption reduction problem with an aggregator that requests electric power consumption reduction to consumers by allocating a part of its profit to them as an incentive. We formulate interactions among consumers as a game, where the incentive to each consumer is determined by his/her contribution to the total power consumption reduction, and the consumer determines his/her own reduction amount selfishly to maximize his/her payoff. The uniqueness of best responses of each consumer and an equilibrium condition of the game are also derived. By using numerical simulations, we show relationship among incentive allocation rate, realized total reduction amount through the game, and the aggregator's payoff for the cases with the for-profit and the nonprofit aggregator.

URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.2019MAI0001/_p

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@ARTICLE{e103-a_2_390,

author={Yuta HASEGAWA, Takafumi KANAZAWA, },

journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},

title={Game Theoretic Analysis of Incentive-Based Power Consumption Reduction Problems with For-Profit or Nonprofit Aggregator},

year={2020},

volume={E103-A},

number={2},

pages={390-397},

abstract={The demand response is attracting attention to perform electric power load leveling. In this paper, we consider a power consumption reduction problem with an aggregator that requests electric power consumption reduction to consumers by allocating a part of its profit to them as an incentive. We formulate interactions among consumers as a game, where the incentive to each consumer is determined by his/her contribution to the total power consumption reduction, and the consumer determines his/her own reduction amount selfishly to maximize his/her payoff. The uniqueness of best responses of each consumer and an equilibrium condition of the game are also derived. By using numerical simulations, we show relationship among incentive allocation rate, realized total reduction amount through the game, and the aggregator's payoff for the cases with the for-profit and the nonprofit aggregator.},

keywords={},

doi={10.1587/transfun.2019MAI0001},

ISSN={1745-1337},

month={February},}

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TY - JOUR

TI - Game Theoretic Analysis of Incentive-Based Power Consumption Reduction Problems with For-Profit or Nonprofit Aggregator

T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals

SP - 390

EP - 397

AU - Yuta HASEGAWA

AU - Takafumi KANAZAWA

PY - 2020

DO - 10.1587/transfun.2019MAI0001

JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals

SN - 1745-1337

VL - E103-A

IS - 2

JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals

Y1 - February 2020

AB - The demand response is attracting attention to perform electric power load leveling. In this paper, we consider a power consumption reduction problem with an aggregator that requests electric power consumption reduction to consumers by allocating a part of its profit to them as an incentive. We formulate interactions among consumers as a game, where the incentive to each consumer is determined by his/her contribution to the total power consumption reduction, and the consumer determines his/her own reduction amount selfishly to maximize his/her payoff. The uniqueness of best responses of each consumer and an equilibrium condition of the game are also derived. By using numerical simulations, we show relationship among incentive allocation rate, realized total reduction amount through the game, and the aggregator's payoff for the cases with the for-profit and the nonprofit aggregator.

ER -