IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Receiver Selective Opening CCA Secure Public Key Encryption from Various Assumptions
Summary :
Receiver selective opening (RSO) attack for public key encryption (PKE) captures a situation where one sender sends messages to multiple receivers, an adversary can corrupt a set of receivers and get their messages and secret keys. Security against RSO attack for a PKE scheme ensures confidentiality of other uncorrupted receivers' ciphertexts. Among all of the RSO security notions, simulation-based RSO security against chosen ciphertext attack (SIM-RSO-CCA security) is the strongest notion. In this paper, we explore constructions of SIM-RSO-CCA secure PKE from various computational assumptions. Toward this goal, we show that a SIM-RSO-CCA secure PKE scheme can be constructed based on an IND-CPA secure PKE scheme and a designated-verifier non-interactive zero-knowledge (DV-NIZK) argument satisfying one-time simulation soundness. Moreover, we give the first construction of DV-NIZK argument satisfying one-time simulation soundness. Consequently, through our generic construction, we obtain the first SIM-RSO-CCA secure PKE scheme under the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) or learning parity with noise (LPN) assumption.
- Publication
- IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals Vol.E104-A No.9 pp.1206-1218
- Publication Date
- 2021/09/01
- Publicized
- 2021/03/16
- Online ISSN
- 1745-1337
- DOI
- 10.1587/transfun.2020DMP0009
- Type of Manuscript
- Special Section PAPER (Special Section on Discrete Mathematics and Its Applications)
- Category
- Cryptography and Information Security
Authors
Yi LU
Tokyo Institute of Technology,National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST)
Keisuke HARA
Tokyo Institute of Technology,National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST)
Keisuke TANAKA
Tokyo Institute of Technology
Keyword
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Yi LU, Keisuke HARA, Keisuke TANAKA, "Receiver Selective Opening CCA Secure Public Key Encryption from Various Assumptions" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E104-A, no. 9, pp. 1206-1218, September 2021, doi: 10.1587/transfun.2020DMP0009.
Abstract: Receiver selective opening (RSO) attack for public key encryption (PKE) captures a situation where one sender sends messages to multiple receivers, an adversary can corrupt a set of receivers and get their messages and secret keys. Security against RSO attack for a PKE scheme ensures confidentiality of other uncorrupted receivers' ciphertexts. Among all of the RSO security notions, simulation-based RSO security against chosen ciphertext attack (SIM-RSO-CCA security) is the strongest notion. In this paper, we explore constructions of SIM-RSO-CCA secure PKE from various computational assumptions. Toward this goal, we show that a SIM-RSO-CCA secure PKE scheme can be constructed based on an IND-CPA secure PKE scheme and a designated-verifier non-interactive zero-knowledge (DV-NIZK) argument satisfying one-time simulation soundness. Moreover, we give the first construction of DV-NIZK argument satisfying one-time simulation soundness. Consequently, through our generic construction, we obtain the first SIM-RSO-CCA secure PKE scheme under the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) or learning parity with noise (LPN) assumption.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.2020DMP0009/_p
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@ARTICLE{e104-a_9_1206,
author={Yi LU, Keisuke HARA, Keisuke TANAKA, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Receiver Selective Opening CCA Secure Public Key Encryption from Various Assumptions},
year={2021},
volume={E104-A},
number={9},
pages={1206-1218},
abstract={Receiver selective opening (RSO) attack for public key encryption (PKE) captures a situation where one sender sends messages to multiple receivers, an adversary can corrupt a set of receivers and get their messages and secret keys. Security against RSO attack for a PKE scheme ensures confidentiality of other uncorrupted receivers' ciphertexts. Among all of the RSO security notions, simulation-based RSO security against chosen ciphertext attack (SIM-RSO-CCA security) is the strongest notion. In this paper, we explore constructions of SIM-RSO-CCA secure PKE from various computational assumptions. Toward this goal, we show that a SIM-RSO-CCA secure PKE scheme can be constructed based on an IND-CPA secure PKE scheme and a designated-verifier non-interactive zero-knowledge (DV-NIZK) argument satisfying one-time simulation soundness. Moreover, we give the first construction of DV-NIZK argument satisfying one-time simulation soundness. Consequently, through our generic construction, we obtain the first SIM-RSO-CCA secure PKE scheme under the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) or learning parity with noise (LPN) assumption.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.2020DMP0009},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={September},}
Copy
TY - JOUR
TI - Receiver Selective Opening CCA Secure Public Key Encryption from Various Assumptions
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 1206
EP - 1218
AU - Yi LU
AU - Keisuke HARA
AU - Keisuke TANAKA
PY - 2021
DO - 10.1587/transfun.2020DMP0009
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E104-A
IS - 9
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - September 2021
AB - Receiver selective opening (RSO) attack for public key encryption (PKE) captures a situation where one sender sends messages to multiple receivers, an adversary can corrupt a set of receivers and get their messages and secret keys. Security against RSO attack for a PKE scheme ensures confidentiality of other uncorrupted receivers' ciphertexts. Among all of the RSO security notions, simulation-based RSO security against chosen ciphertext attack (SIM-RSO-CCA security) is the strongest notion. In this paper, we explore constructions of SIM-RSO-CCA secure PKE from various computational assumptions. Toward this goal, we show that a SIM-RSO-CCA secure PKE scheme can be constructed based on an IND-CPA secure PKE scheme and a designated-verifier non-interactive zero-knowledge (DV-NIZK) argument satisfying one-time simulation soundness. Moreover, we give the first construction of DV-NIZK argument satisfying one-time simulation soundness. Consequently, through our generic construction, we obtain the first SIM-RSO-CCA secure PKE scheme under the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) or learning parity with noise (LPN) assumption.
ER -
English
