IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
The Structural Vulnerability Analysis of Power Grids Based on Second-Order Centrality
Summary :
The application of complex network theory to power grid analysis has been a hot topic in recent years, which mainly manifests itself in four aspects. The first aspect is to model power system networks. The second aspect is to reveal the topology of the grid itself. The third aspect is to reveal the inherent vulnerability and weakness of the power network itself and put forward the pertinent improvement measures to provide guidance for the construction of power grid. The last aspect is to analyze the mechanism of cascading failure and establish the cascading fault model of large power failure. In the past ten years, by using the complex network theory, many researchers have investigated the structural vulnerability of power grids from the point of view of topology. This letter studies the structural vulnerability of power grids according to the effect of selective node removal. We apply several kinds of node centralities including recently-presented second-order centrality (SOC) to guide the node removal attack. We test the effectiveness of all these centralities in guiding the node removal based on several IEEE power grids. Simulation results show that, compared with other node centralities, the SOC is relatively effective in guiding the node removal and can destroy the power grid with negative degree-degree correlation in less steps.
- Publication
- IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals Vol.E100-A No.7 pp.1567-1570
- Publication Date
- 2017/07/01
- Publicized
- Online ISSN
- 1745-1337
- DOI
- 10.1587/transfun.E100.A.1567
- Type of Manuscript
- LETTER
- Category
- Systems and Control
Authors
Zhong-Jian KANG
China University of Petroleum (Eastern China)
Yi-Jia ZHANG
China University of Petroleum (Eastern China)
Xin-Ling GUO
Zhejiang University
Zhe-Ming LU
Zhejiang University
Keyword
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Zhong-Jian KANG, Yi-Jia ZHANG, Xin-Ling GUO, Zhe-Ming LU, "The Structural Vulnerability Analysis of Power Grids Based on Second-Order Centrality" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E100-A, no. 7, pp. 1567-1570, July 2017, doi: 10.1587/transfun.E100.A.1567.
Abstract: The application of complex network theory to power grid analysis has been a hot topic in recent years, which mainly manifests itself in four aspects. The first aspect is to model power system networks. The second aspect is to reveal the topology of the grid itself. The third aspect is to reveal the inherent vulnerability and weakness of the power network itself and put forward the pertinent improvement measures to provide guidance for the construction of power grid. The last aspect is to analyze the mechanism of cascading failure and establish the cascading fault model of large power failure. In the past ten years, by using the complex network theory, many researchers have investigated the structural vulnerability of power grids from the point of view of topology. This letter studies the structural vulnerability of power grids according to the effect of selective node removal. We apply several kinds of node centralities including recently-presented second-order centrality (SOC) to guide the node removal attack. We test the effectiveness of all these centralities in guiding the node removal based on several IEEE power grids. Simulation results show that, compared with other node centralities, the SOC is relatively effective in guiding the node removal and can destroy the power grid with negative degree-degree correlation in less steps.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.E100.A.1567/_p
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@ARTICLE{e100-a_7_1567,
author={Zhong-Jian KANG, Yi-Jia ZHANG, Xin-Ling GUO, Zhe-Ming LU, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={The Structural Vulnerability Analysis of Power Grids Based on Second-Order Centrality},
year={2017},
volume={E100-A},
number={7},
pages={1567-1570},
abstract={The application of complex network theory to power grid analysis has been a hot topic in recent years, which mainly manifests itself in four aspects. The first aspect is to model power system networks. The second aspect is to reveal the topology of the grid itself. The third aspect is to reveal the inherent vulnerability and weakness of the power network itself and put forward the pertinent improvement measures to provide guidance for the construction of power grid. The last aspect is to analyze the mechanism of cascading failure and establish the cascading fault model of large power failure. In the past ten years, by using the complex network theory, many researchers have investigated the structural vulnerability of power grids from the point of view of topology. This letter studies the structural vulnerability of power grids according to the effect of selective node removal. We apply several kinds of node centralities including recently-presented second-order centrality (SOC) to guide the node removal attack. We test the effectiveness of all these centralities in guiding the node removal based on several IEEE power grids. Simulation results show that, compared with other node centralities, the SOC is relatively effective in guiding the node removal and can destroy the power grid with negative degree-degree correlation in less steps.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.E100.A.1567},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={July},}
Copy
TY - JOUR
TI - The Structural Vulnerability Analysis of Power Grids Based on Second-Order Centrality
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 1567
EP - 1570
AU - Zhong-Jian KANG
AU - Yi-Jia ZHANG
AU - Xin-Ling GUO
AU - Zhe-Ming LU
PY - 2017
DO - 10.1587/transfun.E100.A.1567
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E100-A
IS - 7
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - July 2017
AB - The application of complex network theory to power grid analysis has been a hot topic in recent years, which mainly manifests itself in four aspects. The first aspect is to model power system networks. The second aspect is to reveal the topology of the grid itself. The third aspect is to reveal the inherent vulnerability and weakness of the power network itself and put forward the pertinent improvement measures to provide guidance for the construction of power grid. The last aspect is to analyze the mechanism of cascading failure and establish the cascading fault model of large power failure. In the past ten years, by using the complex network theory, many researchers have investigated the structural vulnerability of power grids from the point of view of topology. This letter studies the structural vulnerability of power grids according to the effect of selective node removal. We apply several kinds of node centralities including recently-presented second-order centrality (SOC) to guide the node removal attack. We test the effectiveness of all these centralities in guiding the node removal based on several IEEE power grids. Simulation results show that, compared with other node centralities, the SOC is relatively effective in guiding the node removal and can destroy the power grid with negative degree-degree correlation in less steps.
ER -
English
