IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Nash Equilibria in Combinatorial Auctions with Item Bidding and Subadditive Symmetric Valuations
Summary :
We discuss Nash equilibria in combinatorial auctions with item bidding. Specifically, we give a characterization for the existence of a Nash equilibrium in a combinatorial auction with item bidding when valuations by n bidders satisfy symmetric and subadditive properties. By this characterization, we can obtain an algorithm for deciding whether a Nash equilibrium exists in such a combinatorial auction.
- Publication
- IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals Vol.E101-A No.9 pp.1324-1333
- Publication Date
- 2018/09/01
- Publicized
- Online ISSN
- 1745-1337
- DOI
- 10.1587/transfun.E101.A.1324
- Type of Manuscript
- Special Section PAPER (Special Section on Discrete Mathematics and Its Applications)
- Category
Authors
Hiroyuki UMEDA
Chuo University
Takao ASANO
Chuo University
Keyword
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Hiroyuki UMEDA, Takao ASANO, "Nash Equilibria in Combinatorial Auctions with Item Bidding and Subadditive Symmetric Valuations" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E101-A, no. 9, pp. 1324-1333, September 2018, doi: 10.1587/transfun.E101.A.1324.
Abstract: We discuss Nash equilibria in combinatorial auctions with item bidding. Specifically, we give a characterization for the existence of a Nash equilibrium in a combinatorial auction with item bidding when valuations by n bidders satisfy symmetric and subadditive properties. By this characterization, we can obtain an algorithm for deciding whether a Nash equilibrium exists in such a combinatorial auction.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.E101.A.1324/_p
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@ARTICLE{e101-a_9_1324,
author={Hiroyuki UMEDA, Takao ASANO, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Nash Equilibria in Combinatorial Auctions with Item Bidding and Subadditive Symmetric Valuations},
year={2018},
volume={E101-A},
number={9},
pages={1324-1333},
abstract={We discuss Nash equilibria in combinatorial auctions with item bidding. Specifically, we give a characterization for the existence of a Nash equilibrium in a combinatorial auction with item bidding when valuations by n bidders satisfy symmetric and subadditive properties. By this characterization, we can obtain an algorithm for deciding whether a Nash equilibrium exists in such a combinatorial auction.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.E101.A.1324},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={September},}
Copy
TY - JOUR
TI - Nash Equilibria in Combinatorial Auctions with Item Bidding and Subadditive Symmetric Valuations
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 1324
EP - 1333
AU - Hiroyuki UMEDA
AU - Takao ASANO
PY - 2018
DO - 10.1587/transfun.E101.A.1324
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E101-A
IS - 9
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - September 2018
AB - We discuss Nash equilibria in combinatorial auctions with item bidding. Specifically, we give a characterization for the existence of a Nash equilibrium in a combinatorial auction with item bidding when valuations by n bidders satisfy symmetric and subadditive properties. By this characterization, we can obtain an algorithm for deciding whether a Nash equilibrium exists in such a combinatorial auction.
ER -
English
