IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Impossible Differential Attack on Reduced Round SPARX-128/256
Summary :
SPARX-128/256 is one of the two versions of the SPARX-128 block cipher family. It has 128-bit block size and 256-bit key size. SPARX has been developed using ARX-based S-boxes with the aim of achieving provable security against single-trail differential and linear cryptanalysis. In this letter, we propose 20-round impossible differential distinguishers for SPARX-128. Then, we utilize these distinguishers to attack 24 rounds (out of 40 rounds) of SPARX-128/256. Our attack has time complexity of 2232 memory accesses, memory complexity of 2160.81 128-bit blocks, and data complexity of 2104 chosen plaintexts.
- Publication
- IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals Vol.E101-A No.4 pp.731-733
- Publication Date
- 2018/04/01
- Publicized
- Online ISSN
- 1745-1337
- DOI
- 10.1587/transfun.E101.A.731
- Type of Manuscript
- LETTER
- Category
- Cryptography and Information Security
Authors
Muhammad ELSHEIKH
Concordia University
Mohamed TOLBA
Concordia University
Amr M. YOUSSEF
Concordia University
Keyword
Latest Issue
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Muhammad ELSHEIKH, Mohamed TOLBA, Amr M. YOUSSEF, "Impossible Differential Attack on Reduced Round SPARX-128/256" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E101-A, no. 4, pp. 731-733, April 2018, doi: 10.1587/transfun.E101.A.731.
Abstract: SPARX-128/256 is one of the two versions of the SPARX-128 block cipher family. It has 128-bit block size and 256-bit key size. SPARX has been developed using ARX-based S-boxes with the aim of achieving provable security against single-trail differential and linear cryptanalysis. In this letter, we propose 20-round impossible differential distinguishers for SPARX-128. Then, we utilize these distinguishers to attack 24 rounds (out of 40 rounds) of SPARX-128/256. Our attack has time complexity of 2232 memory accesses, memory complexity of 2160.81 128-bit blocks, and data complexity of 2104 chosen plaintexts.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.E101.A.731/_p
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@ARTICLE{e101-a_4_731,
author={Muhammad ELSHEIKH, Mohamed TOLBA, Amr M. YOUSSEF, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Impossible Differential Attack on Reduced Round SPARX-128/256},
year={2018},
volume={E101-A},
number={4},
pages={731-733},
abstract={SPARX-128/256 is one of the two versions of the SPARX-128 block cipher family. It has 128-bit block size and 256-bit key size. SPARX has been developed using ARX-based S-boxes with the aim of achieving provable security against single-trail differential and linear cryptanalysis. In this letter, we propose 20-round impossible differential distinguishers for SPARX-128. Then, we utilize these distinguishers to attack 24 rounds (out of 40 rounds) of SPARX-128/256. Our attack has time complexity of 2232 memory accesses, memory complexity of 2160.81 128-bit blocks, and data complexity of 2104 chosen plaintexts.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.E101.A.731},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={April},}
Copy
TY - JOUR
TI - Impossible Differential Attack on Reduced Round SPARX-128/256
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 731
EP - 733
AU - Muhammad ELSHEIKH
AU - Mohamed TOLBA
AU - Amr M. YOUSSEF
PY - 2018
DO - 10.1587/transfun.E101.A.731
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E101-A
IS - 4
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - April 2018
AB - SPARX-128/256 is one of the two versions of the SPARX-128 block cipher family. It has 128-bit block size and 256-bit key size. SPARX has been developed using ARX-based S-boxes with the aim of achieving provable security against single-trail differential and linear cryptanalysis. In this letter, we propose 20-round impossible differential distinguishers for SPARX-128. Then, we utilize these distinguishers to attack 24 rounds (out of 40 rounds) of SPARX-128/256. Our attack has time complexity of 2232 memory accesses, memory complexity of 2160.81 128-bit blocks, and data complexity of 2104 chosen plaintexts.
ER -
English
