Leaky Random Oracle
Summary :
This work focuses on a vulnerability of hash functions due to sloppy usages or implementations in the real world. If our cryptographic research community succeeded in the development of a perfectly secure random function as the random oracle, it might be broken in some sense by invalid uses. In this paper, we propose a new variant of the random oracle model in order to analyze the security of cryptographic protocols under the situation of an invalid use of hash functions. Our model allows adversaries to obtain contents of the hash list of input and output pairs arbitrarily. Also, we analyze the security of several prevailing protocols (FDH, OAEP, Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem, Kurosawa-Desmedt cryptosystem, NAXOS) in our model. As the result of analyses, we clarify that FDH and Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem are still secure but others are insecure in our model. This result shows the separation between our model and the standard model.
- Publication
- IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals Vol.E92-A No.8 pp.1795-1807
- Publication Date
- 2009/08/01
- Publicized
- Online ISSN
- 1745-1337
- DOI
- 10.1587/transfun.E92.A.1795
- Type of Manuscript
- Special Section PAPER (Special Section on Discrete Mathematics and Its Applications)
- Category
- Theory
Authors
Keyword
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Kazuki YONEYAMA, Satoshi MIYAGAWA, Kazuo OHTA, "Leaky Random Oracle" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E92-A, no. 8, pp. 1795-1807, August 2009, doi: 10.1587/transfun.E92.A.1795.
Abstract: This work focuses on a vulnerability of hash functions due to sloppy usages or implementations in the real world. If our cryptographic research community succeeded in the development of a perfectly secure random function as the random oracle, it might be broken in some sense by invalid uses. In this paper, we propose a new variant of the random oracle model in order to analyze the security of cryptographic protocols under the situation of an invalid use of hash functions. Our model allows adversaries to obtain contents of the hash list of input and output pairs arbitrarily. Also, we analyze the security of several prevailing protocols (FDH, OAEP, Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem, Kurosawa-Desmedt cryptosystem, NAXOS) in our model. As the result of analyses, we clarify that FDH and Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem are still secure but others are insecure in our model. This result shows the separation between our model and the standard model.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.E92.A.1795/_p
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@ARTICLE{e92-a_8_1795,
author={Kazuki YONEYAMA, Satoshi MIYAGAWA, Kazuo OHTA, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Leaky Random Oracle},
year={2009},
volume={E92-A},
number={8},
pages={1795-1807},
abstract={This work focuses on a vulnerability of hash functions due to sloppy usages or implementations in the real world. If our cryptographic research community succeeded in the development of a perfectly secure random function as the random oracle, it might be broken in some sense by invalid uses. In this paper, we propose a new variant of the random oracle model in order to analyze the security of cryptographic protocols under the situation of an invalid use of hash functions. Our model allows adversaries to obtain contents of the hash list of input and output pairs arbitrarily. Also, we analyze the security of several prevailing protocols (FDH, OAEP, Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem, Kurosawa-Desmedt cryptosystem, NAXOS) in our model. As the result of analyses, we clarify that FDH and Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem are still secure but others are insecure in our model. This result shows the separation between our model and the standard model.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.E92.A.1795},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={August},}
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TY - JOUR
TI - Leaky Random Oracle
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 1795
EP - 1807
AU - Kazuki YONEYAMA
AU - Satoshi MIYAGAWA
AU - Kazuo OHTA
PY - 2009
DO - 10.1587/transfun.E92.A.1795
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E92-A
IS - 8
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - August 2009
AB - This work focuses on a vulnerability of hash functions due to sloppy usages or implementations in the real world. If our cryptographic research community succeeded in the development of a perfectly secure random function as the random oracle, it might be broken in some sense by invalid uses. In this paper, we propose a new variant of the random oracle model in order to analyze the security of cryptographic protocols under the situation of an invalid use of hash functions. Our model allows adversaries to obtain contents of the hash list of input and output pairs arbitrarily. Also, we analyze the security of several prevailing protocols (FDH, OAEP, Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem, Kurosawa-Desmedt cryptosystem, NAXOS) in our model. As the result of analyses, we clarify that FDH and Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem are still secure but others are insecure in our model. This result shows the separation between our model and the standard model.
ER -
English
