The notion of anonymous signatures has recently been formalized by [18], which captures an interesting property that a digital signature can sometimes hide the identity of the signer, if the message is hidden from the verifier. However, in many practical applications, e.g., an anonymous paper review system mentioned in [18], the message for anonymous authentication is actually known to the verifier. This implies that the effectiveness of previous anonymous signatures may be unjustified in these applications. In this paper, we extend the previous models, and develop a related primitive called strong anonymous signatures. For strong anonymous signatures, the identity of the signer remains secret even if the challenge message is chosen by an adversary. We then demonstrate some efficient constructions and prove their security in our model.
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Rui ZHANG, Hideki IMAI, "Strong Anonymous Signature" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E92-A, no. 10, pp. 2487-2491, October 2009, doi: 10.1587/transfun.E92.A.2487.
Abstract: The notion of anonymous signatures has recently been formalized by [18], which captures an interesting property that a digital signature can sometimes hide the identity of the signer, if the message is hidden from the verifier. However, in many practical applications, e.g., an anonymous paper review system mentioned in [18], the message for anonymous authentication is actually known to the verifier. This implies that the effectiveness of previous anonymous signatures may be unjustified in these applications. In this paper, we extend the previous models, and develop a related primitive called strong anonymous signatures. For strong anonymous signatures, the identity of the signer remains secret even if the challenge message is chosen by an adversary. We then demonstrate some efficient constructions and prove their security in our model.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.E92.A.2487/_p
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@ARTICLE{e92-a_10_2487,
author={Rui ZHANG, Hideki IMAI, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Strong Anonymous Signature},
year={2009},
volume={E92-A},
number={10},
pages={2487-2491},
abstract={The notion of anonymous signatures has recently been formalized by [18], which captures an interesting property that a digital signature can sometimes hide the identity of the signer, if the message is hidden from the verifier. However, in many practical applications, e.g., an anonymous paper review system mentioned in [18], the message for anonymous authentication is actually known to the verifier. This implies that the effectiveness of previous anonymous signatures may be unjustified in these applications. In this paper, we extend the previous models, and develop a related primitive called strong anonymous signatures. For strong anonymous signatures, the identity of the signer remains secret even if the challenge message is chosen by an adversary. We then demonstrate some efficient constructions and prove their security in our model.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.E92.A.2487},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={October},}
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TY - JOUR
TI - Strong Anonymous Signature
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 2487
EP - 2491
AU - Rui ZHANG
AU - Hideki IMAI
PY - 2009
DO - 10.1587/transfun.E92.A.2487
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E92-A
IS - 10
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - October 2009
AB - The notion of anonymous signatures has recently been formalized by [18], which captures an interesting property that a digital signature can sometimes hide the identity of the signer, if the message is hidden from the verifier. However, in many practical applications, e.g., an anonymous paper review system mentioned in [18], the message for anonymous authentication is actually known to the verifier. This implies that the effectiveness of previous anonymous signatures may be unjustified in these applications. In this paper, we extend the previous models, and develop a related primitive called strong anonymous signatures. For strong anonymous signatures, the identity of the signer remains secret even if the challenge message is chosen by an adversary. We then demonstrate some efficient constructions and prove their security in our model.
ER -