In PKC 2004, Choi et al. proposed an ID-based authenticated group key agreement (AGKA) protocol using bilinear pairings. Unfortunately, their protocol suffered from an impersonation attack and an insider colluding attack. In 2008, Choi et al. presented an improvement to resist insider attacks. In their modified protocol, they used an ID-based signature scheme on transcripts for binding them in a session to prevent replay of transcripts. In particular, they smartly used the batch verification technique to reduce the computational cost. In this paper, we first show that Choi et al.'s modified AGKA protocol still suffers from an insider colluding attack. Then, we prove that the batch verification of the adopted ID-based signature scheme in their modified protocol suffers from a forgery attack.
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Tsu-Yang WU, Yuh-Min TSENG, "Comments on an ID-Based Authenticated Group Key Agreement Protocol with Withstanding Insider Attacks" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E92-A, no. 10, pp. 2638-2640, October 2009, doi: 10.1587/transfun.E92.A.2638.
Abstract: In PKC 2004, Choi et al. proposed an ID-based authenticated group key agreement (AGKA) protocol using bilinear pairings. Unfortunately, their protocol suffered from an impersonation attack and an insider colluding attack. In 2008, Choi et al. presented an improvement to resist insider attacks. In their modified protocol, they used an ID-based signature scheme on transcripts for binding them in a session to prevent replay of transcripts. In particular, they smartly used the batch verification technique to reduce the computational cost. In this paper, we first show that Choi et al.'s modified AGKA protocol still suffers from an insider colluding attack. Then, we prove that the batch verification of the adopted ID-based signature scheme in their modified protocol suffers from a forgery attack.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.E92.A.2638/_p
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@ARTICLE{e92-a_10_2638,
author={Tsu-Yang WU, Yuh-Min TSENG, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Comments on an ID-Based Authenticated Group Key Agreement Protocol with Withstanding Insider Attacks},
year={2009},
volume={E92-A},
number={10},
pages={2638-2640},
abstract={In PKC 2004, Choi et al. proposed an ID-based authenticated group key agreement (AGKA) protocol using bilinear pairings. Unfortunately, their protocol suffered from an impersonation attack and an insider colluding attack. In 2008, Choi et al. presented an improvement to resist insider attacks. In their modified protocol, they used an ID-based signature scheme on transcripts for binding them in a session to prevent replay of transcripts. In particular, they smartly used the batch verification technique to reduce the computational cost. In this paper, we first show that Choi et al.'s modified AGKA protocol still suffers from an insider colluding attack. Then, we prove that the batch verification of the adopted ID-based signature scheme in their modified protocol suffers from a forgery attack.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.E92.A.2638},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={October},}
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TY - JOUR
TI - Comments on an ID-Based Authenticated Group Key Agreement Protocol with Withstanding Insider Attacks
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 2638
EP - 2640
AU - Tsu-Yang WU
AU - Yuh-Min TSENG
PY - 2009
DO - 10.1587/transfun.E92.A.2638
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E92-A
IS - 10
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - October 2009
AB - In PKC 2004, Choi et al. proposed an ID-based authenticated group key agreement (AGKA) protocol using bilinear pairings. Unfortunately, their protocol suffered from an impersonation attack and an insider colluding attack. In 2008, Choi et al. presented an improvement to resist insider attacks. In their modified protocol, they used an ID-based signature scheme on transcripts for binding them in a session to prevent replay of transcripts. In particular, they smartly used the batch verification technique to reduce the computational cost. In this paper, we first show that Choi et al.'s modified AGKA protocol still suffers from an insider colluding attack. Then, we prove that the batch verification of the adopted ID-based signature scheme in their modified protocol suffers from a forgery attack.
ER -