IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
A Scan-Based Attack Based on Discriminators for AES Cryptosystems
Summary :
A scan chain is one of the most important testing techniques, but it can be used as side-channel attacks against a cryptography LSI. We focus on scan-based attacks, in which scan chains are targeted for side-channel attacks. The conventional scan-based attacks only consider the scan chain composed of only the registers in a cryptography circuit. However, a cryptography LSI usually uses many circuits such as memories, micro processors and other circuits. This means that the conventional attacks cannot be applied to the practical scan chain composed of various types of registers. In this paper, a scan-based attack which enables to decipher the secret key in an AES cryptography LSI composed of an AES circuit and other circuits is proposed. By focusing on bit pattern of the specific register and monitoring its change, our scan-based attack eliminates the influence of registers included in other circuits than AES. Our attack does not depend on scan chain architecture, and it can decipher practical AES cryptography LSIs.
- Publication
- IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals Vol.E92-A No.12 pp.3229-3237
- Publication Date
- 2009/12/01
- Publicized
- Online ISSN
- 1745-1337
- DOI
- 10.1587/transfun.E92.A.3229
- Type of Manuscript
- Special Section PAPER (Special Section on VLSI Design and CAD Algorithms)
- Category
- Embedded, Real-Time and Reconfigurable Systems
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Ryuta NARA, Nozomu TOGAWA, Masao YANAGISAWA, Tatsuo OHTSUKI, "A Scan-Based Attack Based on Discriminators for AES Cryptosystems" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E92-A, no. 12, pp. 3229-3237, December 2009, doi: 10.1587/transfun.E92.A.3229.
Abstract: A scan chain is one of the most important testing techniques, but it can be used as side-channel attacks against a cryptography LSI. We focus on scan-based attacks, in which scan chains are targeted for side-channel attacks. The conventional scan-based attacks only consider the scan chain composed of only the registers in a cryptography circuit. However, a cryptography LSI usually uses many circuits such as memories, micro processors and other circuits. This means that the conventional attacks cannot be applied to the practical scan chain composed of various types of registers. In this paper, a scan-based attack which enables to decipher the secret key in an AES cryptography LSI composed of an AES circuit and other circuits is proposed. By focusing on bit pattern of the specific register and monitoring its change, our scan-based attack eliminates the influence of registers included in other circuits than AES. Our attack does not depend on scan chain architecture, and it can decipher practical AES cryptography LSIs.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.E92.A.3229/_p
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@ARTICLE{e92-a_12_3229,
author={Ryuta NARA, Nozomu TOGAWA, Masao YANAGISAWA, Tatsuo OHTSUKI, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={A Scan-Based Attack Based on Discriminators for AES Cryptosystems},
year={2009},
volume={E92-A},
number={12},
pages={3229-3237},
abstract={A scan chain is one of the most important testing techniques, but it can be used as side-channel attacks against a cryptography LSI. We focus on scan-based attacks, in which scan chains are targeted for side-channel attacks. The conventional scan-based attacks only consider the scan chain composed of only the registers in a cryptography circuit. However, a cryptography LSI usually uses many circuits such as memories, micro processors and other circuits. This means that the conventional attacks cannot be applied to the practical scan chain composed of various types of registers. In this paper, a scan-based attack which enables to decipher the secret key in an AES cryptography LSI composed of an AES circuit and other circuits is proposed. By focusing on bit pattern of the specific register and monitoring its change, our scan-based attack eliminates the influence of registers included in other circuits than AES. Our attack does not depend on scan chain architecture, and it can decipher practical AES cryptography LSIs.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.E92.A.3229},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={December},}
Copy
TY - JOUR
TI - A Scan-Based Attack Based on Discriminators for AES Cryptosystems
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 3229
EP - 3237
AU - Ryuta NARA
AU - Nozomu TOGAWA
AU - Masao YANAGISAWA
AU - Tatsuo OHTSUKI
PY - 2009
DO - 10.1587/transfun.E92.A.3229
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E92-A
IS - 12
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - December 2009
AB - A scan chain is one of the most important testing techniques, but it can be used as side-channel attacks against a cryptography LSI. We focus on scan-based attacks, in which scan chains are targeted for side-channel attacks. The conventional scan-based attacks only consider the scan chain composed of only the registers in a cryptography circuit. However, a cryptography LSI usually uses many circuits such as memories, micro processors and other circuits. This means that the conventional attacks cannot be applied to the practical scan chain composed of various types of registers. In this paper, a scan-based attack which enables to decipher the secret key in an AES cryptography LSI composed of an AES circuit and other circuits is proposed. By focusing on bit pattern of the specific register and monitoring its change, our scan-based attack eliminates the influence of registers included in other circuits than AES. Our attack does not depend on scan chain architecture, and it can decipher practical AES cryptography LSIs.
ER -
English
