Collusion Attacks to Tanaka's Corrected ID-Based Non-interactive Key Sharing Scheme
Summary :
In 2006, Tanaka has proposed an efficient variant of Maurer-Yacobi's identity-based non-interactive key sharing scheme. In Tanaka's scheme, the computational complexity to generate each user's secret information is much smaller than that of Maurer-Yacobi's scheme. Tanaka's original key sharing scheme does not provide completeness, and so Tanaka has corrected the original scheme to provide completeness. In this paper, we show that Tanaka's corrected key sharing scheme is not secure against collusion attacks. That is, two users can collaborate to factorize a system modulus with their secret information and thus break the key sharing scheme.
- Publication
- IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals Vol.E92-A No.3 pp.932-934
- Publication Date
- 2009/03/01
- Publicized
- Online ISSN
- 1745-1337
- DOI
- 10.1587/transfun.E92.A.932
- Type of Manuscript
- LETTER
- Category
- Cryptography and Information Security
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Keyword
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Ik Rae JEONG, Jeong Ok KWON, Dong Hoon LEE, "Collusion Attacks to Tanaka's Corrected ID-Based Non-interactive Key Sharing Scheme" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E92-A, no. 3, pp. 932-934, March 2009, doi: 10.1587/transfun.E92.A.932.
Abstract: In 2006, Tanaka has proposed an efficient variant of Maurer-Yacobi's identity-based non-interactive key sharing scheme. In Tanaka's scheme, the computational complexity to generate each user's secret information is much smaller than that of Maurer-Yacobi's scheme. Tanaka's original key sharing scheme does not provide completeness, and so Tanaka has corrected the original scheme to provide completeness. In this paper, we show that Tanaka's corrected key sharing scheme is not secure against collusion attacks. That is, two users can collaborate to factorize a system modulus with their secret information and thus break the key sharing scheme.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.E92.A.932/_p
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@ARTICLE{e92-a_3_932,
author={Ik Rae JEONG, Jeong Ok KWON, Dong Hoon LEE, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Collusion Attacks to Tanaka's Corrected ID-Based Non-interactive Key Sharing Scheme},
year={2009},
volume={E92-A},
number={3},
pages={932-934},
abstract={In 2006, Tanaka has proposed an efficient variant of Maurer-Yacobi's identity-based non-interactive key sharing scheme. In Tanaka's scheme, the computational complexity to generate each user's secret information is much smaller than that of Maurer-Yacobi's scheme. Tanaka's original key sharing scheme does not provide completeness, and so Tanaka has corrected the original scheme to provide completeness. In this paper, we show that Tanaka's corrected key sharing scheme is not secure against collusion attacks. That is, two users can collaborate to factorize a system modulus with their secret information and thus break the key sharing scheme.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.E92.A.932},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={March},}
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TY - JOUR
TI - Collusion Attacks to Tanaka's Corrected ID-Based Non-interactive Key Sharing Scheme
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 932
EP - 934
AU - Ik Rae JEONG
AU - Jeong Ok KWON
AU - Dong Hoon LEE
PY - 2009
DO - 10.1587/transfun.E92.A.932
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E92-A
IS - 3
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - March 2009
AB - In 2006, Tanaka has proposed an efficient variant of Maurer-Yacobi's identity-based non-interactive key sharing scheme. In Tanaka's scheme, the computational complexity to generate each user's secret information is much smaller than that of Maurer-Yacobi's scheme. Tanaka's original key sharing scheme does not provide completeness, and so Tanaka has corrected the original scheme to provide completeness. In this paper, we show that Tanaka's corrected key sharing scheme is not secure against collusion attacks. That is, two users can collaborate to factorize a system modulus with their secret information and thus break the key sharing scheme.
ER -
English
