IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Security Analysis of 7-Round MISTY1 against Higher Order Differential Attacks
Summary :
MISTY1 is a 64-bit block cipher that has provable security against differential and linear cryptanalysis. MISTY1 is one of the algorithms selected in the European NESSIE project, and it has been recommended for Japanese e-Government ciphers by the CRYPTREC project. This paper shows that higher order differential attacks can be successful against 7-round versions of MISTY1 with FL functions. The attack on 7-round MISTY1 can recover a partial subkey with a data complexity of 254.1 and a computational complexity of 2120.8, which signifies the first successful attack on 7-round MISTY1 with no limitation such as a weak key. This paper also evaluates the complexity of this higher order differential attack on MISTY1 in which the key schedule is replaced by a pseudorandom function. It is shown that resistance to the higher order differential attack is not substantially improved even in 7-round MISTY1 in which the key schedule is replaced by a pseudorandom function.
- Publication
- IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals Vol.E93-A No.1 pp.144-152
- Publication Date
- 2010/01/01
- Publicized
- Online ISSN
- 1745-1337
- DOI
- 10.1587/transfun.E93.A.144
- Type of Manuscript
- Special Section PAPER (Special Section on Cryptography and Information Security)
- Category
- Cryptanalysis
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Keyword
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Yukiyasu TSUNOO, Teruo SAITO, Maki SHIGERI, Takeshi KAWABATA, "Security Analysis of 7-Round MISTY1 against Higher Order Differential Attacks" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E93-A, no. 1, pp. 144-152, January 2010, doi: 10.1587/transfun.E93.A.144.
Abstract: MISTY1 is a 64-bit block cipher that has provable security against differential and linear cryptanalysis. MISTY1 is one of the algorithms selected in the European NESSIE project, and it has been recommended for Japanese e-Government ciphers by the CRYPTREC project. This paper shows that higher order differential attacks can be successful against 7-round versions of MISTY1 with FL functions. The attack on 7-round MISTY1 can recover a partial subkey with a data complexity of 254.1 and a computational complexity of 2120.8, which signifies the first successful attack on 7-round MISTY1 with no limitation such as a weak key. This paper also evaluates the complexity of this higher order differential attack on MISTY1 in which the key schedule is replaced by a pseudorandom function. It is shown that resistance to the higher order differential attack is not substantially improved even in 7-round MISTY1 in which the key schedule is replaced by a pseudorandom function.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.E93.A.144/_p
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@ARTICLE{e93-a_1_144,
author={Yukiyasu TSUNOO, Teruo SAITO, Maki SHIGERI, Takeshi KAWABATA, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Security Analysis of 7-Round MISTY1 against Higher Order Differential Attacks},
year={2010},
volume={E93-A},
number={1},
pages={144-152},
abstract={MISTY1 is a 64-bit block cipher that has provable security against differential and linear cryptanalysis. MISTY1 is one of the algorithms selected in the European NESSIE project, and it has been recommended for Japanese e-Government ciphers by the CRYPTREC project. This paper shows that higher order differential attacks can be successful against 7-round versions of MISTY1 with FL functions. The attack on 7-round MISTY1 can recover a partial subkey with a data complexity of 254.1 and a computational complexity of 2120.8, which signifies the first successful attack on 7-round MISTY1 with no limitation such as a weak key. This paper also evaluates the complexity of this higher order differential attack on MISTY1 in which the key schedule is replaced by a pseudorandom function. It is shown that resistance to the higher order differential attack is not substantially improved even in 7-round MISTY1 in which the key schedule is replaced by a pseudorandom function.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.E93.A.144},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={January},}
Copy
TY - JOUR
TI - Security Analysis of 7-Round MISTY1 against Higher Order Differential Attacks
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 144
EP - 152
AU - Yukiyasu TSUNOO
AU - Teruo SAITO
AU - Maki SHIGERI
AU - Takeshi KAWABATA
PY - 2010
DO - 10.1587/transfun.E93.A.144
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E93-A
IS - 1
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - January 2010
AB - MISTY1 is a 64-bit block cipher that has provable security against differential and linear cryptanalysis. MISTY1 is one of the algorithms selected in the European NESSIE project, and it has been recommended for Japanese e-Government ciphers by the CRYPTREC project. This paper shows that higher order differential attacks can be successful against 7-round versions of MISTY1 with FL functions. The attack on 7-round MISTY1 can recover a partial subkey with a data complexity of 254.1 and a computational complexity of 2120.8, which signifies the first successful attack on 7-round MISTY1 with no limitation such as a weak key. This paper also evaluates the complexity of this higher order differential attack on MISTY1 in which the key schedule is replaced by a pseudorandom function. It is shown that resistance to the higher order differential attack is not substantially improved even in 7-round MISTY1 in which the key schedule is replaced by a pseudorandom function.
ER -
English
