IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Multi-Pass Malware Sandbox Analysis with Controlled Internet Connection
Summary :
Malware sandbox analysis, in which a malware sample is actually executed in a testing environment (i.e. sandbox) to observe its behavior, is one of the promising approaches to tackling the emerging threats of exploding malware. As a lot of recent malware actively communicates with remote hosts over the Internet, sandboxes should also support an Internet connection, otherwise important malware behavior may not be observed. In this paper, we propose a multi-pass sandbox analysis with a controlled Internet connection. In the proposed method, we start our analysis with an isolated sandbox and an emulated Internet that consists of a set of dummy servers and hosts that run vulnerable services, called Honeypots in the Sandbox (HitS). All outbound connections from the victim host are closely inspected to see if they could be connected to the real Internet. We iterate the above process until no new behaviors are observed. We implemented the proposed method in a completely automated fashion and evaluated it with malware samples recently captured in the wild. Using a simple containment policy that authorizes only certain application protocols, namely, HTTP, IRC, and DNS, we were able to observe a greater variety of behaviors compared with the completely isolated sandbox. Meanwhile, we confirmed that a noticeable number of IP scans, vulnerability exploitations, and DoS attacks are successfully contained in the sandbox. Additionally, a brief comparison with two existing sandbox analysis systems, Norman Sandbox and CWSandbox, are shown.
- Publication
- IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals Vol.E93-A No.1 pp.210-218
- Publication Date
- 2010/01/01
- Publicized
- Online ISSN
- 1745-1337
- DOI
- 10.1587/transfun.E93.A.210
- Type of Manuscript
- Special Section PAPER (Special Section on Cryptography and Information Security)
- Category
- Application
Authors
Keyword
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Katsunari YOSHIOKA, Tsutomu MATSUMOTO, "Multi-Pass Malware Sandbox Analysis with Controlled Internet Connection" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E93-A, no. 1, pp. 210-218, January 2010, doi: 10.1587/transfun.E93.A.210.
Abstract: Malware sandbox analysis, in which a malware sample is actually executed in a testing environment (i.e. sandbox) to observe its behavior, is one of the promising approaches to tackling the emerging threats of exploding malware. As a lot of recent malware actively communicates with remote hosts over the Internet, sandboxes should also support an Internet connection, otherwise important malware behavior may not be observed. In this paper, we propose a multi-pass sandbox analysis with a controlled Internet connection. In the proposed method, we start our analysis with an isolated sandbox and an emulated Internet that consists of a set of dummy servers and hosts that run vulnerable services, called Honeypots in the Sandbox (HitS). All outbound connections from the victim host are closely inspected to see if they could be connected to the real Internet. We iterate the above process until no new behaviors are observed. We implemented the proposed method in a completely automated fashion and evaluated it with malware samples recently captured in the wild. Using a simple containment policy that authorizes only certain application protocols, namely, HTTP, IRC, and DNS, we were able to observe a greater variety of behaviors compared with the completely isolated sandbox. Meanwhile, we confirmed that a noticeable number of IP scans, vulnerability exploitations, and DoS attacks are successfully contained in the sandbox. Additionally, a brief comparison with two existing sandbox analysis systems, Norman Sandbox and CWSandbox, are shown.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.E93.A.210/_p
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@ARTICLE{e93-a_1_210,
author={Katsunari YOSHIOKA, Tsutomu MATSUMOTO, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Multi-Pass Malware Sandbox Analysis with Controlled Internet Connection},
year={2010},
volume={E93-A},
number={1},
pages={210-218},
abstract={Malware sandbox analysis, in which a malware sample is actually executed in a testing environment (i.e. sandbox) to observe its behavior, is one of the promising approaches to tackling the emerging threats of exploding malware. As a lot of recent malware actively communicates with remote hosts over the Internet, sandboxes should also support an Internet connection, otherwise important malware behavior may not be observed. In this paper, we propose a multi-pass sandbox analysis with a controlled Internet connection. In the proposed method, we start our analysis with an isolated sandbox and an emulated Internet that consists of a set of dummy servers and hosts that run vulnerable services, called Honeypots in the Sandbox (HitS). All outbound connections from the victim host are closely inspected to see if they could be connected to the real Internet. We iterate the above process until no new behaviors are observed. We implemented the proposed method in a completely automated fashion and evaluated it with malware samples recently captured in the wild. Using a simple containment policy that authorizes only certain application protocols, namely, HTTP, IRC, and DNS, we were able to observe a greater variety of behaviors compared with the completely isolated sandbox. Meanwhile, we confirmed that a noticeable number of IP scans, vulnerability exploitations, and DoS attacks are successfully contained in the sandbox. Additionally, a brief comparison with two existing sandbox analysis systems, Norman Sandbox and CWSandbox, are shown.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.E93.A.210},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={January},}
Copy
TY - JOUR
TI - Multi-Pass Malware Sandbox Analysis with Controlled Internet Connection
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 210
EP - 218
AU - Katsunari YOSHIOKA
AU - Tsutomu MATSUMOTO
PY - 2010
DO - 10.1587/transfun.E93.A.210
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E93-A
IS - 1
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - January 2010
AB - Malware sandbox analysis, in which a malware sample is actually executed in a testing environment (i.e. sandbox) to observe its behavior, is one of the promising approaches to tackling the emerging threats of exploding malware. As a lot of recent malware actively communicates with remote hosts over the Internet, sandboxes should also support an Internet connection, otherwise important malware behavior may not be observed. In this paper, we propose a multi-pass sandbox analysis with a controlled Internet connection. In the proposed method, we start our analysis with an isolated sandbox and an emulated Internet that consists of a set of dummy servers and hosts that run vulnerable services, called Honeypots in the Sandbox (HitS). All outbound connections from the victim host are closely inspected to see if they could be connected to the real Internet. We iterate the above process until no new behaviors are observed. We implemented the proposed method in a completely automated fashion and evaluated it with malware samples recently captured in the wild. Using a simple containment policy that authorizes only certain application protocols, namely, HTTP, IRC, and DNS, we were able to observe a greater variety of behaviors compared with the completely isolated sandbox. Meanwhile, we confirmed that a noticeable number of IP scans, vulnerability exploitations, and DoS attacks are successfully contained in the sandbox. Additionally, a brief comparison with two existing sandbox analysis systems, Norman Sandbox and CWSandbox, are shown.
ER -
English
