The search functionality is under construction.

The search functionality is under construction.

Every public-key encryption scheme has to incorporate a certain amount of randomness into its ciphertexts to provide semantic security against chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA). The difference between the length of a ciphertext and the embedded message is called the *ciphertext overhead*. While a generic brute-force adversary running in 2* ^{t}* steps gives a theoretical lower bound of

- Publication
- IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals Vol.E93-A No.1 pp.22-33

- Publication Date
- 2010/01/01

- Publicized

- Online ISSN
- 1745-1337

- DOI
- 10.1587/transfun.E93.A.22

- Type of Manuscript
- Special Section PAPER (Special Section on Cryptography and Information Security)

- Category
- Public Key Cryptography

The copyright of the original papers published on this site belongs to IEICE. Unauthorized use of the original or translated papers is prohibited. See IEICE Provisions on Copyright for details.

Copy

Masayuki ABE, Eike KILTZ, Tatsuaki OKAMOTO, "Chosen Ciphertext Security with Optimal Ciphertext Overhead" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E93-A, no. 1, pp. 22-33, January 2010, doi: 10.1587/transfun.E93.A.22.

Abstract: Every public-key encryption scheme has to incorporate a certain amount of randomness into its ciphertexts to provide semantic security against chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA). The difference between the length of a ciphertext and the embedded message is called the *ciphertext overhead*. While a generic brute-force adversary running in 2* ^{t}* steps gives a theoretical lower bound of

URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.E93.A.22/_p

Copy

@ARTICLE{e93-a_1_22,

author={Masayuki ABE, Eike KILTZ, Tatsuaki OKAMOTO, },

journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},

title={Chosen Ciphertext Security with Optimal Ciphertext Overhead},

year={2010},

volume={E93-A},

number={1},

pages={22-33},

abstract={Every public-key encryption scheme has to incorporate a certain amount of randomness into its ciphertexts to provide semantic security against chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA). The difference between the length of a ciphertext and the embedded message is called the *ciphertext overhead*. While a generic brute-force adversary running in 2* ^{t}* steps gives a theoretical lower bound of

keywords={},

doi={10.1587/transfun.E93.A.22},

ISSN={1745-1337},

month={January},}

Copy

TY - JOUR

TI - Chosen Ciphertext Security with Optimal Ciphertext Overhead

T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals

SP - 22

EP - 33

AU - Masayuki ABE

AU - Eike KILTZ

AU - Tatsuaki OKAMOTO

PY - 2010

DO - 10.1587/transfun.E93.A.22

JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals

SN - 1745-1337

VL - E93-A

IS - 1

JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals

Y1 - January 2010

AB - Every public-key encryption scheme has to incorporate a certain amount of randomness into its ciphertexts to provide semantic security against chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA). The difference between the length of a ciphertext and the embedded message is called the *ciphertext overhead*. While a generic brute-force adversary running in 2* ^{t}* steps gives a theoretical lower bound of

ER -