Every public-key encryption scheme has to incorporate a certain amount of randomness into its ciphertexts to provide semantic security against chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA). The difference between the length of a ciphertext and the embedded message is called the ciphertext overhead. While a generic brute-force adversary running in 2t steps gives a theoretical lower bound of t bits on the ciphertext overhead for IND-CPA security, the best known IND-CCA secure schemes demand roughly 2t bits even in the random oracle model. Is the t-bit gap essential for achieving IND-CCA security? We close the gap by proposing an IND-CCA secure scheme whose ciphertext overhead matches the generic lower bound up to a small constant. Our scheme uses a variation of a four-round Feistel network in the random oracle model and hence belongs to the family of OAEP-based schemes. Maybe of independent interest is a new efficient method to encrypt long messages exceeding the length of the permutation while retaining the minimal overhead.
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Masayuki ABE, Eike KILTZ, Tatsuaki OKAMOTO, "Chosen Ciphertext Security with Optimal Ciphertext Overhead" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E93-A, no. 1, pp. 22-33, January 2010, doi: 10.1587/transfun.E93.A.22.
Abstract: Every public-key encryption scheme has to incorporate a certain amount of randomness into its ciphertexts to provide semantic security against chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA). The difference between the length of a ciphertext and the embedded message is called the ciphertext overhead. While a generic brute-force adversary running in 2t steps gives a theoretical lower bound of t bits on the ciphertext overhead for IND-CPA security, the best known IND-CCA secure schemes demand roughly 2t bits even in the random oracle model. Is the t-bit gap essential for achieving IND-CCA security? We close the gap by proposing an IND-CCA secure scheme whose ciphertext overhead matches the generic lower bound up to a small constant. Our scheme uses a variation of a four-round Feistel network in the random oracle model and hence belongs to the family of OAEP-based schemes. Maybe of independent interest is a new efficient method to encrypt long messages exceeding the length of the permutation while retaining the minimal overhead.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.E93.A.22/_p
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@ARTICLE{e93-a_1_22,
author={Masayuki ABE, Eike KILTZ, Tatsuaki OKAMOTO, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Chosen Ciphertext Security with Optimal Ciphertext Overhead},
year={2010},
volume={E93-A},
number={1},
pages={22-33},
abstract={Every public-key encryption scheme has to incorporate a certain amount of randomness into its ciphertexts to provide semantic security against chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA). The difference between the length of a ciphertext and the embedded message is called the ciphertext overhead. While a generic brute-force adversary running in 2t steps gives a theoretical lower bound of t bits on the ciphertext overhead for IND-CPA security, the best known IND-CCA secure schemes demand roughly 2t bits even in the random oracle model. Is the t-bit gap essential for achieving IND-CCA security? We close the gap by proposing an IND-CCA secure scheme whose ciphertext overhead matches the generic lower bound up to a small constant. Our scheme uses a variation of a four-round Feistel network in the random oracle model and hence belongs to the family of OAEP-based schemes. Maybe of independent interest is a new efficient method to encrypt long messages exceeding the length of the permutation while retaining the minimal overhead.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.E93.A.22},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={January},}
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TY - JOUR
TI - Chosen Ciphertext Security with Optimal Ciphertext Overhead
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 22
EP - 33
AU - Masayuki ABE
AU - Eike KILTZ
AU - Tatsuaki OKAMOTO
PY - 2010
DO - 10.1587/transfun.E93.A.22
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E93-A
IS - 1
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - January 2010
AB - Every public-key encryption scheme has to incorporate a certain amount of randomness into its ciphertexts to provide semantic security against chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA). The difference between the length of a ciphertext and the embedded message is called the ciphertext overhead. While a generic brute-force adversary running in 2t steps gives a theoretical lower bound of t bits on the ciphertext overhead for IND-CPA security, the best known IND-CCA secure schemes demand roughly 2t bits even in the random oracle model. Is the t-bit gap essential for achieving IND-CCA security? We close the gap by proposing an IND-CCA secure scheme whose ciphertext overhead matches the generic lower bound up to a small constant. Our scheme uses a variation of a four-round Feistel network in the random oracle model and hence belongs to the family of OAEP-based schemes. Maybe of independent interest is a new efficient method to encrypt long messages exceeding the length of the permutation while retaining the minimal overhead.
ER -