IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Access-Driven Cache Attack on the Stream Cipher DICING Using the Chosen IV
Summary :
A cache attack against DICING is presented. Cache attacks use CPU cache miss and hit information as side-channel information. DICING is a stream cipher that was proposed at eSTREAM. No effective attack on DICING has been reported before. Because DICING uses a key-dependent S-box and there is no key addition before the first S-box layer, a conventional cache attack is considered to be difficult. We therefore investigated an access-driven cache attack that employs the special features of transformation L to give the chosen IV. We also investigated reduction of the computational complexity required to obtain the secret key from the information gained in the cache attack. We were able to obtain a 40-bit key differential given a total of 218 chosen IVs on a Pentium III processor. From the obtained key differential, the 128-bit secret key could be recovered with computational complexity of from 249 to 263. This result shows that the new cache attack, which is based on a different attack model, is also applicable in an actual environment.
- Publication
- IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals Vol.E93-A No.4 pp.799-807
- Publication Date
- 2010/04/01
- Publicized
- Online ISSN
- 1745-1337
- DOI
- 10.1587/transfun.E93.A.799
- Type of Manuscript
- PAPER
- Category
- Cryptography and Information Security
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Keyword
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Yukiyasu TSUNOO, Takeshi KAWABATA, Tomoyasu SUZAKI, Hiroyasu KUBO, Teruo SAITO, "Access-Driven Cache Attack on the Stream Cipher DICING Using the Chosen IV" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E93-A, no. 4, pp. 799-807, April 2010, doi: 10.1587/transfun.E93.A.799.
Abstract: A cache attack against DICING is presented. Cache attacks use CPU cache miss and hit information as side-channel information. DICING is a stream cipher that was proposed at eSTREAM. No effective attack on DICING has been reported before. Because DICING uses a key-dependent S-box and there is no key addition before the first S-box layer, a conventional cache attack is considered to be difficult. We therefore investigated an access-driven cache attack that employs the special features of transformation L to give the chosen IV. We also investigated reduction of the computational complexity required to obtain the secret key from the information gained in the cache attack. We were able to obtain a 40-bit key differential given a total of 218 chosen IVs on a Pentium III processor. From the obtained key differential, the 128-bit secret key could be recovered with computational complexity of from 249 to 263. This result shows that the new cache attack, which is based on a different attack model, is also applicable in an actual environment.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.E93.A.799/_p
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@ARTICLE{e93-a_4_799,
author={Yukiyasu TSUNOO, Takeshi KAWABATA, Tomoyasu SUZAKI, Hiroyasu KUBO, Teruo SAITO, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Access-Driven Cache Attack on the Stream Cipher DICING Using the Chosen IV},
year={2010},
volume={E93-A},
number={4},
pages={799-807},
abstract={A cache attack against DICING is presented. Cache attacks use CPU cache miss and hit information as side-channel information. DICING is a stream cipher that was proposed at eSTREAM. No effective attack on DICING has been reported before. Because DICING uses a key-dependent S-box and there is no key addition before the first S-box layer, a conventional cache attack is considered to be difficult. We therefore investigated an access-driven cache attack that employs the special features of transformation L to give the chosen IV. We also investigated reduction of the computational complexity required to obtain the secret key from the information gained in the cache attack. We were able to obtain a 40-bit key differential given a total of 218 chosen IVs on a Pentium III processor. From the obtained key differential, the 128-bit secret key could be recovered with computational complexity of from 249 to 263. This result shows that the new cache attack, which is based on a different attack model, is also applicable in an actual environment.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.E93.A.799},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={April},}
Copy
TY - JOUR
TI - Access-Driven Cache Attack on the Stream Cipher DICING Using the Chosen IV
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 799
EP - 807
AU - Yukiyasu TSUNOO
AU - Takeshi KAWABATA
AU - Tomoyasu SUZAKI
AU - Hiroyasu KUBO
AU - Teruo SAITO
PY - 2010
DO - 10.1587/transfun.E93.A.799
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E93-A
IS - 4
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - April 2010
AB - A cache attack against DICING is presented. Cache attacks use CPU cache miss and hit information as side-channel information. DICING is a stream cipher that was proposed at eSTREAM. No effective attack on DICING has been reported before. Because DICING uses a key-dependent S-box and there is no key addition before the first S-box layer, a conventional cache attack is considered to be difficult. We therefore investigated an access-driven cache attack that employs the special features of transformation L to give the chosen IV. We also investigated reduction of the computational complexity required to obtain the secret key from the information gained in the cache attack. We were able to obtain a 40-bit key differential given a total of 218 chosen IVs on a Pentium III processor. From the obtained key differential, the 128-bit secret key could be recovered with computational complexity of from 249 to 263. This result shows that the new cache attack, which is based on a different attack model, is also applicable in an actual environment.
ER -
English
