IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Power Analysis against a DPA-Resistant S-Box Implementation Based on the Fourier Transform
Summary :
This paper shows two power analysis attacks against a software implementation of a first-order DPA resistant S-box algorithm that is based on the discrete Fourier Transform (DFT). The DPA resistant S-box algorithm based on DFT was proposed by Prouff et al. in 2006 and improved by Coron et al. in 2008, respectively. In our attacks against the improved one, we pre-process the power traces by separating them into two subgroups, so that each has a biased mask. For the separated power traces, two post analysis methods are proposed to identify the key. One is based on DPA attack against one subgroup, and the other utilizes the difference of means for two subgroups and a pattern matching. Finally, we compare these two attack methods and propose an algorithm-level countermeasure to enhance the security of S-box calculation based on the DFT.
- Publication
- IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals Vol.E94-A No.1 pp.191-199
- Publication Date
- 2011/01/01
- Publicized
- Online ISSN
- 1745-1337
- DOI
- 10.1587/transfun.E94.A.191
- Type of Manuscript
- Special Section PAPER (Special Section on Cryptography and Information Security)
- Category
- Implementation
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Keyword
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Yang LI, Kazuo SAKIYAMA, Shinichi KAWAMURA, Kazuo OHTA, "Power Analysis against a DPA-Resistant S-Box Implementation Based on the Fourier Transform" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E94-A, no. 1, pp. 191-199, January 2011, doi: 10.1587/transfun.E94.A.191.
Abstract: This paper shows two power analysis attacks against a software implementation of a first-order DPA resistant S-box algorithm that is based on the discrete Fourier Transform (DFT). The DPA resistant S-box algorithm based on DFT was proposed by Prouff et al. in 2006 and improved by Coron et al. in 2008, respectively. In our attacks against the improved one, we pre-process the power traces by separating them into two subgroups, so that each has a biased mask. For the separated power traces, two post analysis methods are proposed to identify the key. One is based on DPA attack against one subgroup, and the other utilizes the difference of means for two subgroups and a pattern matching. Finally, we compare these two attack methods and propose an algorithm-level countermeasure to enhance the security of S-box calculation based on the DFT.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.E94.A.191/_p
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@ARTICLE{e94-a_1_191,
author={Yang LI, Kazuo SAKIYAMA, Shinichi KAWAMURA, Kazuo OHTA, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Power Analysis against a DPA-Resistant S-Box Implementation Based on the Fourier Transform},
year={2011},
volume={E94-A},
number={1},
pages={191-199},
abstract={This paper shows two power analysis attacks against a software implementation of a first-order DPA resistant S-box algorithm that is based on the discrete Fourier Transform (DFT). The DPA resistant S-box algorithm based on DFT was proposed by Prouff et al. in 2006 and improved by Coron et al. in 2008, respectively. In our attacks against the improved one, we pre-process the power traces by separating them into two subgroups, so that each has a biased mask. For the separated power traces, two post analysis methods are proposed to identify the key. One is based on DPA attack against one subgroup, and the other utilizes the difference of means for two subgroups and a pattern matching. Finally, we compare these two attack methods and propose an algorithm-level countermeasure to enhance the security of S-box calculation based on the DFT.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.E94.A.191},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={January},}
Copy
TY - JOUR
TI - Power Analysis against a DPA-Resistant S-Box Implementation Based on the Fourier Transform
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 191
EP - 199
AU - Yang LI
AU - Kazuo SAKIYAMA
AU - Shinichi KAWAMURA
AU - Kazuo OHTA
PY - 2011
DO - 10.1587/transfun.E94.A.191
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E94-A
IS - 1
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - January 2011
AB - This paper shows two power analysis attacks against a software implementation of a first-order DPA resistant S-box algorithm that is based on the discrete Fourier Transform (DFT). The DPA resistant S-box algorithm based on DFT was proposed by Prouff et al. in 2006 and improved by Coron et al. in 2008, respectively. In our attacks against the improved one, we pre-process the power traces by separating them into two subgroups, so that each has a biased mask. For the separated power traces, two post analysis methods are proposed to identify the key. One is based on DPA attack against one subgroup, and the other utilizes the difference of means for two subgroups and a pattern matching. Finally, we compare these two attack methods and propose an algorithm-level countermeasure to enhance the security of S-box calculation based on the DFT.
ER -
English
