We propose preimage attacks against PKC98-Hash and HAS-V. PKC98-Hash is a 160-bit hash function proposed at PKC 1998, and HAS-V, a hash function proposed at SAC 2000, can produce hash values of 128+32k (k=0,1,...,6) bits. These hash functions adopt the Merkle-Damgård and Davies-Meyer constructions. One unique characteristic of these hash functions is that their step functions are not injective with a fixed message. We utilize this property to mount preimage attacks against these hash functions. Note that these attacks can work for an arbitrary number of steps. The best proposed attacks generate preimages of PKC98-Hash and HAS-V-320 in 264 and 2256 compression function computations with negligible memory, respectively. This is the first preimage attack against the full PKC98-Hash function.
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Yu SASAKI, Florian MENDEL, Kazumaro AOKI, "Preimage Attacks against PKC98-Hash and HAS-V" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E95-A, no. 1, pp. 111-124, January 2012, doi: 10.1587/transfun.E95.A.111.
Abstract: We propose preimage attacks against PKC98-Hash and HAS-V. PKC98-Hash is a 160-bit hash function proposed at PKC 1998, and HAS-V, a hash function proposed at SAC 2000, can produce hash values of 128+32k (k=0,1,...,6) bits. These hash functions adopt the Merkle-Damgård and Davies-Meyer constructions. One unique characteristic of these hash functions is that their step functions are not injective with a fixed message. We utilize this property to mount preimage attacks against these hash functions. Note that these attacks can work for an arbitrary number of steps. The best proposed attacks generate preimages of PKC98-Hash and HAS-V-320 in 264 and 2256 compression function computations with negligible memory, respectively. This is the first preimage attack against the full PKC98-Hash function.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.E95.A.111/_p
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@ARTICLE{e95-a_1_111,
author={Yu SASAKI, Florian MENDEL, Kazumaro AOKI, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Preimage Attacks against PKC98-Hash and HAS-V},
year={2012},
volume={E95-A},
number={1},
pages={111-124},
abstract={We propose preimage attacks against PKC98-Hash and HAS-V. PKC98-Hash is a 160-bit hash function proposed at PKC 1998, and HAS-V, a hash function proposed at SAC 2000, can produce hash values of 128+32k (k=0,1,...,6) bits. These hash functions adopt the Merkle-Damgård and Davies-Meyer constructions. One unique characteristic of these hash functions is that their step functions are not injective with a fixed message. We utilize this property to mount preimage attacks against these hash functions. Note that these attacks can work for an arbitrary number of steps. The best proposed attacks generate preimages of PKC98-Hash and HAS-V-320 in 264 and 2256 compression function computations with negligible memory, respectively. This is the first preimage attack against the full PKC98-Hash function.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.E95.A.111},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={January},}
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TY - JOUR
TI - Preimage Attacks against PKC98-Hash and HAS-V
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 111
EP - 124
AU - Yu SASAKI
AU - Florian MENDEL
AU - Kazumaro AOKI
PY - 2012
DO - 10.1587/transfun.E95.A.111
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E95-A
IS - 1
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - January 2012
AB - We propose preimage attacks against PKC98-Hash and HAS-V. PKC98-Hash is a 160-bit hash function proposed at PKC 1998, and HAS-V, a hash function proposed at SAC 2000, can produce hash values of 128+32k (k=0,1,...,6) bits. These hash functions adopt the Merkle-Damgård and Davies-Meyer constructions. One unique characteristic of these hash functions is that their step functions are not injective with a fixed message. We utilize this property to mount preimage attacks against these hash functions. Note that these attacks can work for an arbitrary number of steps. The best proposed attacks generate preimages of PKC98-Hash and HAS-V-320 in 264 and 2256 compression function computations with negligible memory, respectively. This is the first preimage attack against the full PKC98-Hash function.
ER -