Proxy cryptosystems are classified into proxy decryption systems and proxy re-encryption systems on the basis of a proxy's role. In this paper, we propose an ID-based proxy cryptosystem with revocability and hierarchical confidentialities. In our scheme, on receiving a ciphertext, the proxy has the rights to perform the following three tasks according to the message confidentiality levels of the sender's intention: (1) to decrypt the ciphertext on behalf of the original decryptor; (2) to re-encrypt the ciphertext such that another user who is designated by the original decryptor can learn the message; (3) to do nothing except for forwarding the ciphertext to the original decryptor. Our scheme supports revocability in the sense that it allows proxy's decryption and re-encryption rights to be revoked even during the valid period of the proxy key without changing the original decryptor's public information. We prove that our proposal is indistinguishable against chosen identity and plaintext attacks in the standard model. We also show how to convert it into a system against chosen identity and ciphertext attacks by using the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation.
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Lihua WANG, Licheng WANG, Masahiro MAMBO, Eiji OKAMOTO, "Identity-Based Proxy Cryptosystems with Revocability and Hierarchical Confidentialities" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E95-A, no. 1, pp. 70-88, January 2012, doi: 10.1587/transfun.E95.A.70.
Abstract: Proxy cryptosystems are classified into proxy decryption systems and proxy re-encryption systems on the basis of a proxy's role. In this paper, we propose an ID-based proxy cryptosystem with revocability and hierarchical confidentialities. In our scheme, on receiving a ciphertext, the proxy has the rights to perform the following three tasks according to the message confidentiality levels of the sender's intention: (1) to decrypt the ciphertext on behalf of the original decryptor; (2) to re-encrypt the ciphertext such that another user who is designated by the original decryptor can learn the message; (3) to do nothing except for forwarding the ciphertext to the original decryptor. Our scheme supports revocability in the sense that it allows proxy's decryption and re-encryption rights to be revoked even during the valid period of the proxy key without changing the original decryptor's public information. We prove that our proposal is indistinguishable against chosen identity and plaintext attacks in the standard model. We also show how to convert it into a system against chosen identity and ciphertext attacks by using the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.E95.A.70/_p
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@ARTICLE{e95-a_1_70,
author={Lihua WANG, Licheng WANG, Masahiro MAMBO, Eiji OKAMOTO, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Identity-Based Proxy Cryptosystems with Revocability and Hierarchical Confidentialities},
year={2012},
volume={E95-A},
number={1},
pages={70-88},
abstract={Proxy cryptosystems are classified into proxy decryption systems and proxy re-encryption systems on the basis of a proxy's role. In this paper, we propose an ID-based proxy cryptosystem with revocability and hierarchical confidentialities. In our scheme, on receiving a ciphertext, the proxy has the rights to perform the following three tasks according to the message confidentiality levels of the sender's intention: (1) to decrypt the ciphertext on behalf of the original decryptor; (2) to re-encrypt the ciphertext such that another user who is designated by the original decryptor can learn the message; (3) to do nothing except for forwarding the ciphertext to the original decryptor. Our scheme supports revocability in the sense that it allows proxy's decryption and re-encryption rights to be revoked even during the valid period of the proxy key without changing the original decryptor's public information. We prove that our proposal is indistinguishable against chosen identity and plaintext attacks in the standard model. We also show how to convert it into a system against chosen identity and ciphertext attacks by using the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.E95.A.70},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={January},}
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TY - JOUR
TI - Identity-Based Proxy Cryptosystems with Revocability and Hierarchical Confidentialities
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 70
EP - 88
AU - Lihua WANG
AU - Licheng WANG
AU - Masahiro MAMBO
AU - Eiji OKAMOTO
PY - 2012
DO - 10.1587/transfun.E95.A.70
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E95-A
IS - 1
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - January 2012
AB - Proxy cryptosystems are classified into proxy decryption systems and proxy re-encryption systems on the basis of a proxy's role. In this paper, we propose an ID-based proxy cryptosystem with revocability and hierarchical confidentialities. In our scheme, on receiving a ciphertext, the proxy has the rights to perform the following three tasks according to the message confidentiality levels of the sender's intention: (1) to decrypt the ciphertext on behalf of the original decryptor; (2) to re-encrypt the ciphertext such that another user who is designated by the original decryptor can learn the message; (3) to do nothing except for forwarding the ciphertext to the original decryptor. Our scheme supports revocability in the sense that it allows proxy's decryption and re-encryption rights to be revoked even during the valid period of the proxy key without changing the original decryptor's public information. We prove that our proposal is indistinguishable against chosen identity and plaintext attacks in the standard model. We also show how to convert it into a system against chosen identity and ciphertext attacks by using the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation.
ER -