IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
One-Round Authenticated Key Exchange with Strong Forward Secrecy in the Standard Model against Constrained Adversary
Summary :
Forward secrecy (FS) is a central security requirement of authenticated key exchange (AKE). Especially, strong FS (sFS) is desirable because it can guarantee security against a very realistic attack scenario that an adversary is allowed to be active in the target session. However, most of AKE schemes cannot achieve sFS, and currently known schemes with sFS are only proved in the random oracle model. In this paper, we propose a generic construction of AKE protocol with sFS in the standard model against a constrained adversary. The constraint is that session-specific intermediate computation results (i.e., session state) cannot be revealed to the adversary for achieving sFS, that is shown to be inevitable by Boyd and González Nieto. However, our scheme maintains weak FS (wFS) if session state is available to the adversary. Thus, our scheme satisfies one of strongest security definitions, the CK+ model, which includes wFS and session state reveal. The main idea to achieve sFS is to use signcryption KEM while the previous CK+ secure construction uses ordinary KEM. We show a possible instantiation of our construction from Diffie-Hellman problems.
- Publication
- IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals Vol.E96-A No.6 pp.1124-1138
- Publication Date
- 2013/06/01
- Publicized
- Online ISSN
- 1745-1337
- DOI
- 10.1587/transfun.E96.A.1124
- Type of Manuscript
- Special Section PAPER (Special Section on Discrete Mathematics and Its Applications)
- Category
Authors
Kazuki YONEYAMA
NTT Corporation
Keyword
Latest Issue
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Kazuki YONEYAMA, "One-Round Authenticated Key Exchange with Strong Forward Secrecy in the Standard Model against Constrained Adversary" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E96-A, no. 6, pp. 1124-1138, June 2013, doi: 10.1587/transfun.E96.A.1124.
Abstract: Forward secrecy (FS) is a central security requirement of authenticated key exchange (AKE). Especially, strong FS (sFS) is desirable because it can guarantee security against a very realistic attack scenario that an adversary is allowed to be active in the target session. However, most of AKE schemes cannot achieve sFS, and currently known schemes with sFS are only proved in the random oracle model. In this paper, we propose a generic construction of AKE protocol with sFS in the standard model against a constrained adversary. The constraint is that session-specific intermediate computation results (i.e., session state) cannot be revealed to the adversary for achieving sFS, that is shown to be inevitable by Boyd and González Nieto. However, our scheme maintains weak FS (wFS) if session state is available to the adversary. Thus, our scheme satisfies one of strongest security definitions, the CK+ model, which includes wFS and session state reveal. The main idea to achieve sFS is to use signcryption KEM while the previous CK+ secure construction uses ordinary KEM. We show a possible instantiation of our construction from Diffie-Hellman problems.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.E96.A.1124/_p
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@ARTICLE{e96-a_6_1124,
author={Kazuki YONEYAMA, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={One-Round Authenticated Key Exchange with Strong Forward Secrecy in the Standard Model against Constrained Adversary},
year={2013},
volume={E96-A},
number={6},
pages={1124-1138},
abstract={Forward secrecy (FS) is a central security requirement of authenticated key exchange (AKE). Especially, strong FS (sFS) is desirable because it can guarantee security against a very realistic attack scenario that an adversary is allowed to be active in the target session. However, most of AKE schemes cannot achieve sFS, and currently known schemes with sFS are only proved in the random oracle model. In this paper, we propose a generic construction of AKE protocol with sFS in the standard model against a constrained adversary. The constraint is that session-specific intermediate computation results (i.e., session state) cannot be revealed to the adversary for achieving sFS, that is shown to be inevitable by Boyd and González Nieto. However, our scheme maintains weak FS (wFS) if session state is available to the adversary. Thus, our scheme satisfies one of strongest security definitions, the CK+ model, which includes wFS and session state reveal. The main idea to achieve sFS is to use signcryption KEM while the previous CK+ secure construction uses ordinary KEM. We show a possible instantiation of our construction from Diffie-Hellman problems.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.E96.A.1124},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={June},}
Copy
TY - JOUR
TI - One-Round Authenticated Key Exchange with Strong Forward Secrecy in the Standard Model against Constrained Adversary
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 1124
EP - 1138
AU - Kazuki YONEYAMA
PY - 2013
DO - 10.1587/transfun.E96.A.1124
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E96-A
IS - 6
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - June 2013
AB - Forward secrecy (FS) is a central security requirement of authenticated key exchange (AKE). Especially, strong FS (sFS) is desirable because it can guarantee security against a very realistic attack scenario that an adversary is allowed to be active in the target session. However, most of AKE schemes cannot achieve sFS, and currently known schemes with sFS are only proved in the random oracle model. In this paper, we propose a generic construction of AKE protocol with sFS in the standard model against a constrained adversary. The constraint is that session-specific intermediate computation results (i.e., session state) cannot be revealed to the adversary for achieving sFS, that is shown to be inevitable by Boyd and González Nieto. However, our scheme maintains weak FS (wFS) if session state is available to the adversary. Thus, our scheme satisfies one of strongest security definitions, the CK+ model, which includes wFS and session state reveal. The main idea to achieve sFS is to use signcryption KEM while the previous CK+ secure construction uses ordinary KEM. We show a possible instantiation of our construction from Diffie-Hellman problems.
ER -
English
