In 2004, Menezes and Smart left an open problem that is whether there exists a realistic scenario where message and key substitution (MKS) attacks can have damaging consequences. In this letter, we show that MKS attacks can have damaging consequences in practice, by pointing out that a verifiably encrypted signature (VES) scheme is not opaque if MKS attacks are possible.
Bennian DOU
Nanjing University of Science and Technology
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Bennian DOU, "Message and Key Substitution Attacks on Verifiably Encrypted Signature Schemes" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E96-A, no. 6, pp. 1171-1172, June 2013, doi: 10.1587/transfun.E96.A.1171.
Abstract: In 2004, Menezes and Smart left an open problem that is whether there exists a realistic scenario where message and key substitution (MKS) attacks can have damaging consequences. In this letter, we show that MKS attacks can have damaging consequences in practice, by pointing out that a verifiably encrypted signature (VES) scheme is not opaque if MKS attacks are possible.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.E96.A.1171/_p
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@ARTICLE{e96-a_6_1171,
author={Bennian DOU, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Message and Key Substitution Attacks on Verifiably Encrypted Signature Schemes},
year={2013},
volume={E96-A},
number={6},
pages={1171-1172},
abstract={In 2004, Menezes and Smart left an open problem that is whether there exists a realistic scenario where message and key substitution (MKS) attacks can have damaging consequences. In this letter, we show that MKS attacks can have damaging consequences in practice, by pointing out that a verifiably encrypted signature (VES) scheme is not opaque if MKS attacks are possible.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.E96.A.1171},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={June},}
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TY - JOUR
TI - Message and Key Substitution Attacks on Verifiably Encrypted Signature Schemes
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 1171
EP - 1172
AU - Bennian DOU
PY - 2013
DO - 10.1587/transfun.E96.A.1171
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E96-A
IS - 6
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - June 2013
AB - In 2004, Menezes and Smart left an open problem that is whether there exists a realistic scenario where message and key substitution (MKS) attacks can have damaging consequences. In this letter, we show that MKS attacks can have damaging consequences in practice, by pointing out that a verifiably encrypted signature (VES) scheme is not opaque if MKS attacks are possible.
ER -