IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
A New Type of Fault-Based Attack: Fault Behavior Analysis
Summary :
Fault-based attacks are very powerful to recover the secret key for cryptographic implementations. In this work, we consider the faulty output value under a certain fault injection intensity as a new type of leakage called faulty behavior. We examine the data-dependency of the faulty behavior and propose a related side-channel attack called fault behavior analysis (FBA). To verify the validity of the proposed attack, we first show that our attack can work effectively on AES-COMP of SASEBO-R. Then we show how to apply the similar attack on two AES implementations with masking countermeasures, i.e., AES-MAO and AES-TI. Finally we compare the proposed FBA attack with the DFA attack and the FSA attack, trying to complete the research map for the fault-based attack based on setup-time violations.
- Publication
- IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals Vol.E96-A No.1 pp.177-184
- Publication Date
- 2013/01/01
- Publicized
- Online ISSN
- 1745-1337
- DOI
- 10.1587/transfun.E96.A.177
- Type of Manuscript
- Special Section PAPER (Special Section on Cryptography and Information Security)
- Category
- Implementation
Authors
Keyword
Latest Issue
Copyrights notice of machine-translated contents
The copyright of the original papers published on this site belongs to IEICE. Unauthorized use of the original or translated papers is prohibited. See IEICE Provisions on Copyright for details.
Cite this
Copy
Yang LI, Kazuo OHTA, Kazuo SAKIYAMA, "A New Type of Fault-Based Attack: Fault Behavior Analysis" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E96-A, no. 1, pp. 177-184, January 2013, doi: 10.1587/transfun.E96.A.177.
Abstract: Fault-based attacks are very powerful to recover the secret key for cryptographic implementations. In this work, we consider the faulty output value under a certain fault injection intensity as a new type of leakage called faulty behavior. We examine the data-dependency of the faulty behavior and propose a related side-channel attack called fault behavior analysis (FBA). To verify the validity of the proposed attack, we first show that our attack can work effectively on AES-COMP of SASEBO-R. Then we show how to apply the similar attack on two AES implementations with masking countermeasures, i.e., AES-MAO and AES-TI. Finally we compare the proposed FBA attack with the DFA attack and the FSA attack, trying to complete the research map for the fault-based attack based on setup-time violations.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.E96.A.177/_p
Copy
@ARTICLE{e96-a_1_177,
author={Yang LI, Kazuo OHTA, Kazuo SAKIYAMA, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={A New Type of Fault-Based Attack: Fault Behavior Analysis},
year={2013},
volume={E96-A},
number={1},
pages={177-184},
abstract={Fault-based attacks are very powerful to recover the secret key for cryptographic implementations. In this work, we consider the faulty output value under a certain fault injection intensity as a new type of leakage called faulty behavior. We examine the data-dependency of the faulty behavior and propose a related side-channel attack called fault behavior analysis (FBA). To verify the validity of the proposed attack, we first show that our attack can work effectively on AES-COMP of SASEBO-R. Then we show how to apply the similar attack on two AES implementations with masking countermeasures, i.e., AES-MAO and AES-TI. Finally we compare the proposed FBA attack with the DFA attack and the FSA attack, trying to complete the research map for the fault-based attack based on setup-time violations.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.E96.A.177},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={January},}
Copy
TY - JOUR
TI - A New Type of Fault-Based Attack: Fault Behavior Analysis
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 177
EP - 184
AU - Yang LI
AU - Kazuo OHTA
AU - Kazuo SAKIYAMA
PY - 2013
DO - 10.1587/transfun.E96.A.177
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E96-A
IS - 1
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - January 2013
AB - Fault-based attacks are very powerful to recover the secret key for cryptographic implementations. In this work, we consider the faulty output value under a certain fault injection intensity as a new type of leakage called faulty behavior. We examine the data-dependency of the faulty behavior and propose a related side-channel attack called fault behavior analysis (FBA). To verify the validity of the proposed attack, we first show that our attack can work effectively on AES-COMP of SASEBO-R. Then we show how to apply the similar attack on two AES implementations with masking countermeasures, i.e., AES-MAO and AES-TI. Finally we compare the proposed FBA attack with the DFA attack and the FSA attack, trying to complete the research map for the fault-based attack based on setup-time violations.
ER -
English
