Attribute-Based Identification: Definitions and Efficient Constructions

Hiroaki ANADA; Seiko ARITA; Sari HANDA; Yosuke IWABUCHI

doi:10.1587/transfun.E97.A.1086

IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals

Attribute-Based Identification: Definitions and Efficient Constructions

Hiroaki ANADA, Seiko ARITA, Sari HANDA, Yosuke IWABUCHI

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We propose a notion of attribute-based identification (ABID) in two flavors: prover-policy ABID (PP-ABID) and verifier-policy ABID (VP-ABID). In a PP-ABID scheme, a prover has an authorized access policy written as a boolean formula over attributes, while each verifier maintains a set of attributes. The prover is accepted when his access policy fits the verifier's set of attributes. In a VP-ABID scheme, a verifier maintains an access policy written as a boolean formula over attributes, while each prover has a set of authorized attributes. The prover is accepted when his set of attributes satisfies the verifier's access policy. Our design principle is first to construct key-policy and ciphertext-policy attribute-based key encapsulation mechanisms (KP-ABKEM and CP-ABKEM). Second, we convert KP-ABKEM and CP-ABKEM into challenge-and-response PP-ABID and VP-ABID, respectively, by encapsulation-and-decapsulation. There, we show that KP-ABKEM and CP-ABKEM only have to be secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks on one-wayness (OW-CCA secure) for the obtained PP-ABID and VP-ABID to be secure against concurrent man-in-the-middle attacks (cMiM secure). According to the design principle, we construct concrete KP-ABKEM and CP-ABKEM with the OW-CCA security by enhancing the KP-ABKEM of Ostrovsky, Sahai and Waters and CP-ABKEM of Waters, respectively. Finally, we obtain concrete PP-ABID and VP-ABID schemes that are proved to be selectively secure in the standard model against cMiM attacks.

Publication: IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals Vol.E97-A No.5 pp.1086-1102

Publication Date: 2014/05/01

Publicized

Online ISSN: 1745-1337

DOI: 10.1587/transfun.E97.A.1086

Type of Manuscript: PAPER

Category: Cryptography and Information Security

Authors

Hiroaki ANADA
  Institute of Information Security,Information Technologies and Nanotechnologies (ISIT)
Seiko ARITA
  Institute of Information Security
Sari HANDA
  Institute of Information Security
Yosuke IWABUCHI
  Institute of Information Security

Keyword

access policy, attribute, identification, KEM

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Hiroaki ANADA, Seiko ARITA, Sari HANDA, Yosuke IWABUCHI, "Attribute-Based Identification: Definitions and Efficient Constructions" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals, vol. E97-A, no. 5, pp. 1086-1102, May 2014, doi: 10.1587/transfun.E97.A.1086.
Abstract: We propose a notion of attribute-based identification (ABID) in two flavors: prover-policy ABID (PP-ABID) and verifier-policy ABID (VP-ABID). In a PP-ABID scheme, a prover has an authorized access policy written as a boolean formula over attributes, while each verifier maintains a set of attributes. The prover is accepted when his access policy fits the verifier's set of attributes. In a VP-ABID scheme, a verifier maintains an access policy written as a boolean formula over attributes, while each prover has a set of authorized attributes. The prover is accepted when his set of attributes satisfies the verifier's access policy. Our design principle is first to construct key-policy and ciphertext-policy attribute-based key encapsulation mechanisms (KP-ABKEM and CP-ABKEM). Second, we convert KP-ABKEM and CP-ABKEM into challenge-and-response PP-ABID and VP-ABID, respectively, by encapsulation-and-decapsulation. There, we show that KP-ABKEM and CP-ABKEM only have to be secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks on one-wayness (OW-CCA secure) for the obtained PP-ABID and VP-ABID to be secure against concurrent man-in-the-middle attacks (cMiM secure). According to the design principle, we construct concrete KP-ABKEM and CP-ABKEM with the OW-CCA security by enhancing the KP-ABKEM of Ostrovsky, Sahai and Waters and CP-ABKEM of Waters, respectively. Finally, we obtain concrete PP-ABID and VP-ABID schemes that are proved to be selectively secure in the standard model against cMiM attacks.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.E97.A.1086/_p

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@ARTICLE{e97-a_5_1086,
author={Hiroaki ANADA, Seiko ARITA, Sari HANDA, Yosuke IWABUCHI, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Attribute-Based Identification: Definitions and Efficient Constructions},
year={2014},
volume={E97-A},
number={5},
pages={1086-1102},
abstract={We propose a notion of attribute-based identification (ABID) in two flavors: prover-policy ABID (PP-ABID) and verifier-policy ABID (VP-ABID). In a PP-ABID scheme, a prover has an authorized access policy written as a boolean formula over attributes, while each verifier maintains a set of attributes. The prover is accepted when his access policy fits the verifier's set of attributes. In a VP-ABID scheme, a verifier maintains an access policy written as a boolean formula over attributes, while each prover has a set of authorized attributes. The prover is accepted when his set of attributes satisfies the verifier's access policy. Our design principle is first to construct key-policy and ciphertext-policy attribute-based key encapsulation mechanisms (KP-ABKEM and CP-ABKEM). Second, we convert KP-ABKEM and CP-ABKEM into challenge-and-response PP-ABID and VP-ABID, respectively, by encapsulation-and-decapsulation. There, we show that KP-ABKEM and CP-ABKEM only have to be secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks on one-wayness (OW-CCA secure) for the obtained PP-ABID and VP-ABID to be secure against concurrent man-in-the-middle attacks (cMiM secure). According to the design principle, we construct concrete KP-ABKEM and CP-ABKEM with the OW-CCA security by enhancing the KP-ABKEM of Ostrovsky, Sahai and Waters and CP-ABKEM of Waters, respectively. Finally, we obtain concrete PP-ABID and VP-ABID schemes that are proved to be selectively secure in the standard model against cMiM attacks.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.E97.A.1086},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={May},}

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TY - JOUR
TI - Attribute-Based Identification: Definitions and Efficient Constructions
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 1086
EP - 1102
AU - Hiroaki ANADA
AU - Seiko ARITA
AU - Sari HANDA
AU - Yosuke IWABUCHI
PY - 2014
DO - 10.1587/transfun.E97.A.1086
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E97-A
IS - 5
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - May 2014
AB - We propose a notion of attribute-based identification (ABID) in two flavors: prover-policy ABID (PP-ABID) and verifier-policy ABID (VP-ABID). In a PP-ABID scheme, a prover has an authorized access policy written as a boolean formula over attributes, while each verifier maintains a set of attributes. The prover is accepted when his access policy fits the verifier's set of attributes. In a VP-ABID scheme, a verifier maintains an access policy written as a boolean formula over attributes, while each prover has a set of authorized attributes. The prover is accepted when his set of attributes satisfies the verifier's access policy. Our design principle is first to construct key-policy and ciphertext-policy attribute-based key encapsulation mechanisms (KP-ABKEM and CP-ABKEM). Second, we convert KP-ABKEM and CP-ABKEM into challenge-and-response PP-ABID and VP-ABID, respectively, by encapsulation-and-decapsulation. There, we show that KP-ABKEM and CP-ABKEM only have to be secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks on one-wayness (OW-CCA secure) for the obtained PP-ABID and VP-ABID to be secure against concurrent man-in-the-middle attacks (cMiM secure). According to the design principle, we construct concrete KP-ABKEM and CP-ABKEM with the OW-CCA security by enhancing the KP-ABKEM of Ostrovsky, Sahai and Waters and CP-ABKEM of Waters, respectively. Finally, we obtain concrete PP-ABID and VP-ABID schemes that are proved to be selectively secure in the standard model against cMiM attacks.
ER -

IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals